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A CRITIQUE OF THE RULE-MAKING PROCESS IN FEDERAL
INCOME TAX LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
CONGLOMERATE ACQUISITIONS
WILLIAm D. POPKINt
INTRODUCTION
The federal income tax law contains many detailed and confused
provisions, but none have quite the same ancient lineage as the rules
relating to corporate acquisitions. The law has provided an exemption
for selling shareholders when corporations merge and the shareholders
have retained an equity interest in the acquiring corporation since
1918.1 The deferral of tax when a sale is in exchange for debt, including
a sale of stock, goes back almost as far.2 From an acquirer's point
of view, the use of debt as consideration has the added attraction that
interest is deductible, an old rule of general application not limited to
use of debt in a purchase.' These rules have undergone a long process
of judicial, administrative and legislative changes, the latest of which
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. The first provision appeared in the Revenue Act of 1918, § 202(b), 40 Stat. 1060.
It applied to exchanges of stock and securities for stock and securities in *'reorganiza-
tions, mergers and consolidations." The law had a number of irrational limitations on
the investor's exemption, such as its inapplicability (1) to the excess of the par value of
the stock or securities received over the par value of the stock or securities sold and
(2) to transactions in which the corporation transferred assets. These limitations were
removed in the Revenue Act of 1921, § 20 2 (c) (2), 42 Stat. 230. In 1924 the transfer by
the corporation transferring assets was also exempt. Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(b) (3),
43 Stat. 256. The "continuity of interest" requirement was firmly established by judicial
decision in Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933).
The current highly articulated version of these rules appears in INT. REv. CODE of 1954
§§ 354, 356, 361 and 368 (hereim-ter all section references are to the INTERNAL. RSVENUE
CODE Of 1954 unless otherwise specified).
2. The first statutory provision appeared in the Revenue Act of 1926, § 212(d), 44
Stat. 23. Prior Treasury Regulations had allowed deferral but some Board of Tax Ap-
peal cases had questioned their validity; S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1926);
reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2) Cum. BULL. 346-47. The current provision is § 453.
3. The deduction for interest was authorized by the Revenue Act of 1913, § II
G(b) (first), 38 Stat. 172, which was the general "ordinary and necessary expense" pro-
vision, now found in § 162. The deduction was subject to certain limitations found in 38
Stat. 173, § II G(b) (third), which were eliminated in the Revenue Act of 1918, § 234(a)
(2), 40 Stat. 1077. The earlier limiting provision has survived in § 163 as a provision
broadening the interest deduction for corporations to include capital expenditures.
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deals with the use of corporate debt and derives primary impetus from
Congressional antipathy towards conglomerate acquisitions.4  This
article, a study of that process, has as its primary goal the re-examination
of the way tax rules are made.
The framework for the study is the maze of rules which have special
importance for conglomerate acquisitions. The first part deals with the
history of tax-exempt mergers, tax-deferred sales and the treatment of
original issue discount prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The second
part is a description and critique of changes made by the Tax Reform Act
affecting conglomerate acquisitions. Part three is an analysis of the taxa-
tion of "sweeteners," such as conversion privileges, warrants and contin-
gent stock which are often used in conglomerate acquisitions. The fourth
part provides some final observations on the rule-making process and sug-
gestions for change.
I. TAX-EXEMPT AND TAX-DEFERRED SALES AND
ORIGINAL ISSUE DISCOUNT
A. TAX-EXEMPT MERGERS
The provisions of the Code exempting mergers were born at a
time when the structural assumptions of the tax law were in their
infancy. Two major policies explain the early legislation: (1) to en-
courage economically desirable business arrangements;' and (2) to
provide relief from taxation when the investor's interest continued to
depend on the same business risks.6 A third consideration which might
help to explain the exemption for mergers appeared in another pro-
vision which exempted gain whenever the proceeds of the sale lacked a
readily realizable market value.' Although this rule remained in statutory
4. TAX REFORM ACT of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 (hereinafter cited as TAX REFORM
Act), § 411 (disallowance of interest deduction on corporate acquisition indebtedness),
adding § 279; § 412 (unavailability of deferral of gain under installment method for
certain corporate debt), amending § 453(b) ; § 413 (modifying taxation and reporting
of original issue discount), amending §§ 1232(a) and (b) and 6049(a) (1) and (c).
See Hearings Before the House Ways and Means Committee on the Subject of Tax
Reform, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2363-2550 (1969) (hereinafter cited as House Hearings).
5. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2)
CuM. BULL. 176.
6. S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 5, 6 (1918), reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2)
Cum. BULL. 120 (exchanges considered "paper transactions"). These were the days
when the taxation of unrealized gains was a question of constitutional significance;
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). While corporate reorganizations were held
to involve realized gain (United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921)), there had been
some administrative uncertainty on this question, the history of which is traced in R.
Paul, Reorganizations, in STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (3d Series) 8-9 (1940).
7. Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 230.
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form for only three years,8 it is possible that the chance of receiving
such property was a contributing factor in the legislation on mergers.
The development of the requirement that the shareholder continue
an investment in the acquiring corporation manifests an attempt by
the courts to interpret the law in light of its intended purpose, followed
by a retreat into literalism which misapplied that purpose. The 1921
statute exempted the receipt of stock or securities in a "merger," which
was defined to include the acquisition of stock or assets.9 The courts
refused to apply this provision literally, and required that the securities
received provide some continuity of interest.'0 But the continuity re-
quired did not insure that the seller's risk continue to depend upon the
assets acquired to any significant degree. On the contrary, the equity
received did not have to represent a significant percentage of the voting
or profit interest of the buying corporation;" the equity could be
solely non-voting and non-participating preferred. 2 Significant amounts
of debt and cash could be received as long as a "material part" of the
consideration provided the watered-down continuity.3 Although equity
without a voting or profit participation qualified a transaction for
exemption, long-term debt did not provide the needed continuity.14
Apparently, however, debt was not the equivalent of cash in determining
whether debt and equity together provided the necessary continuity. 5
If cash or debt (referred to as "boot") did not destroy the exemp-
tion for the equity by causing the transaction to be a taxable sale, the
cash (and, since the 1954 Code, the debt under certain circumstances)
was taxed as if it had the effect of a dividend for the shareholder.'"
8. H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924), reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2)
Cub!. BULL. 250-51. The concept has been reintroduced in the case law by Burnett v.
Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931), which not only defers tax when the proceeds have "no
ascertainable fair market value," but apparently converts the income on the investment
received into proceeds of the sale. But cf. Warren v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 846
(Ct. Cl. 1959) in which the receipt of a "property interest" as proceeds of a sale caused
future income to be taxed as a return on an investment.
9. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c) (2), 42 Stat. 230.
10. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933).
11. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935).
12. Nelson v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374, 377 (1935).
13. Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1935). The Service recently
ruled that there is sufficient continuity if the equity received equals at least 50 per cent of
the value of the acquired corporation; Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 114. The
Minnesota Tea case (supra note 11 at 386) had referred to a "material part of the value
of the transferred assets," not a percentage of the value of the acquired corporation.
14. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940) (about 94 per cent of the consideration
was long-term debt and 6 per cent cash).
15. Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387 (about 48 per cent equity and 52 per cent
long-term debt sufficient continuity) ; the figures are derived from the courts of appeals
opinion, 75 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1935).
16. This provision entered the law in the Revenue Act of 1924, § 203(d) (2), 43
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However, since the original merger provision was confused with the
exemption for exchanges of like-kind property, the amount taxed as a
dividend was limited to the gain realized upon the disposition of stock in
the merger.17
Judgments on the amount of cash and debt on the one hand, and
equity on the other, which can be received without turning the trans-
action into a taxable sale, are currently made in the aggregate for all
shareholders. Thus, although one shareholder receives only stock, if the
total consideration received by all shareholders includes excessive amounts
of cash and/or debt, the transaction is a taxable sale for all share-
holders. However, if the amount of cash and/or debt is not excessive,
it appears to be permissible to rearrange the ownership among the
continuing shareholders to a significant extent without losing exemption
for the equity."8
Prior to 1934 there were three recognized methods of consummat-
ing an exempt merger, each of which required the necessary con-
tinuity: (1) a merger pursuant to state merger laws; (2) a transfer of
at least a majority of stock of a corporation ("stock-for-stock" merger) ;
and (3) a transfer of substantially all the assets of a corporation ("asset"
merger)."9 Stock-for-stock and asset mergers were exempted to provide
uniform tax results for economically similar transactions even if state
law did not allow statutory mergers.
The Revenue Act of 1934, however, provided that exemption was
obtainable for stock-for-stock and asset mergers only if the consideration
received was solely voting stock.2" If any cash, debt or non-voting stock
was received by the sellers, the entire transaction was treated as a
taxable sale to all shareholders. The enactment of a voting stock require-
ment is mystifying since the absence of a requirement that the per-
Stat. 257; H.R. RP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924), reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part
2) Cum. BULL. 252. The current provision is § 356(a) (2).
The 1954 Code eliminated the complete exemption for securities if the principal
amount of the securities received exceeded the principal amount of the securities sur-
rendered; §§ 354(a) (2) and 356(d) contain the reference to the "principal amount," an
error similar to the dependence of tax on "par value" in 1918; see note 1 supra.
17. Tlhe changes in the Revenue Act of 1924 which enabled boot to be taxed as a
dividend (see note 16 supra) appeared immediately after the section which imposed a tax
on the boot in both like kind and reorganization exchanges.
18. Rev. Rul. 66-224, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 114 allowed two of four shareholders own-
ing 50 per cent of the equity to receive only cash.
19. Revenue Act of 1932, § 112(i) (1) (A), 47 Stat. 198.
20. Revenue Act of 1934, § 112(g) (1) (A) and (B), 48 Stat. 705. In addition, the
stock-for-stock mergers became exempt only if at least 80 per cent of the target corpora-
tion's stock was acquired (§ 112(g) (1) (B)). Since 1954 an asset acquisition is exempt
if boot, including any liabilities to which the transferred property is subject, does not
exceed 20 percent of the value of the property; § 368(a) (2) (B).
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centage of voting continuity be significant indicates a lack of concern
for retention of voting power.
These new rules introduced an elective element into the tax law
whenever the sale was for voting stock since it was fairly easy to add a
small amount of cash, debt or non-voting stock to the voting stock with-
out basically changing the economic nature of the transaction. This
election was very important to the taxpayer since losses were not re-
cognized in an exempt merger." It is clear that Congress was aware in
1934 of the possibility of recognizing losses since one of the major reasons
for retaining the tax-exempt merger provisions at all was to prevent taking
losses during the depression." Yet a statute was fashioned which did
not prevent the taxpayer from electing to take a loss.22
The 1934 rules contained another anomaly. If a statutory merger
was available under state law, the option to shape the transaction as a
taxable sale was available not only when the deal was primarily for
voting stock, but also when a substantial amount of other consideration
was used. Thus, if it was desirable to obtain tax-free equity, a statutory
merger could be accomplished. If a tax loss was desired or if the capital
gains tax on equity and non-equity was less than the tax at ordinary
rates on the proceeds, taxed as a dividend, the taxable route might be
followed. If an option as to the tax result was desirable to encourage
mergers, however, it is difficult to understand why it should have been
limited to transactions in which statutory mergers were available.
The Treasury tried to forestall these legislative developments by
requesting general authority to deal with mergers by Regulation.2
However, Congress rejected the request and began the process of elaborat-
ing rules on exempt mergers which has not stopped today.25
21. Revenue Act of 1934, § 112(e), 48 Stat. 705; the current provision is § 356(c).
22. A subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee had proposed elimin-
ating the reorganization provisions; PmVNTION OF TAX AVOIDANCE, PRELIMINARY RE-
PORT OF A SUBCoMM. OF THE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9
(Comm. Print 1933). However, recognition of losses during the depression was seen
as the immediate result of such a repeal (H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-14
(1934), reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2) Cum. BULL. 563-64).
23. Under current law, though not in 1934, another major problem arises out of the
elective quality of a transaction which is basically for voting stock but which will allow
a small amount of other consideration to be added. Since the Revenue Act of 1936, the
acquiring corporation's basis in the acquired property has depended upon whether the
transaction is an exempt merger to the seller. If it is exempt the seller's basis carries
over to the buyer, but if it is not exempt, the buyer's basis is cost. (Revenue Act of
1936, § 113(a) (7), 49 Stat. 1683). In many cases, the value of the assets has appreciated,
and the acquirer is anxious to obtain the higher cost basis. In 1936 this problem might
not have been perceived because of the depression.
24. See R. PAUL, Reorganizations in STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (3rd Series) 38
(1940).
25. The latest effort involves statutory mergers into subsidiaries. See Pub. L. No.
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Continuation of the relaxed continuity of interest rules for statutory
mergers is crucial to the consummation of conglomerate acquisitions.
First, sellers often require something safer than common stock. The use
of non-participating preferred stock is, therefore, desirable, and the buyer
finds this congenial since the equity need not carry a voting privilege.26
Second, the acquisitions often occur in several stages, the earlier stages
of which involve cash or debt. These earlier acquisitions give the buyer
a chance to get information about the target to which only shareholders are
entitled and contributes momentum to its later offers, which in turn
encourages management and shareholders to put up less of a fight. Since
a series of events are often judged as parts of one transaction for tax
purposes the exemption of a later stage of an acquisition, which involves
solely voting stock, can be assured only because the statutory merger
route allows the use of non-equity."
Another episode in the development of tax exemption for mergers,
which is significant for an understanding of the taxation of conglomerate
mergers and the rule-making process, occurred in 1954 with the modi-
fication of the rules for so-called "creeping mergers." Prior to 1954, a
seller was exempt when he sold stock solely for voting stock only if
the corporation acquired eighty per cent of the target corporation in one
transaction. 8 A sale of thirty per cent of the stock in 1953 was not exempt
if sixty per cent had been purchased in 1939. The 1954 Code provided
that the second acquisition, which gave the acquiring corporation the
required eighty per cent interest, would be exempt if the considera-
tion in the second acquisition satisfied the strict solely-for-voting stock re-
quirements.2 Exemption for these "creeping acquisitions," so named
because the buyer can creep along in his acquisition rather than become the
owner of eighty per cent all at once, might have resulted from impatience
with granting an exemption to each shareholder only if all shareholders
got voting stock. Once shareholders in the target corporation were not
90-621, § 1(a) (1969), adding, § 368(a) (2) (D). The new rules refer to "substantially
all" the assets being merged into the subsidiary and it is unclear whether this require-
ment was intended; 30 J. TAXATION 327 (May 1969).
26. See statistics in Part II(B) of the text.
27. When Lykes sought to acquire Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Lykes originally
acquired less than majority control for debt. It later sought a statutory merger using
convertible preferred and debt. In order to assure exemption, it limited the debt offer to
an amount which, when combined with the earlier acquisition for debt, would not destroy
exemption for the convertible preferred. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 20, 1969, at 34, col. 1.
In the LTV-Wilson merger, LTV bought 53 per cent of the stock for cash (Wall
Street Journal, Jan. 9, 1967, at 4, col. 3) and then advised (with a certainty that defies
explanation) that the acquisition five months later for equity of the remaining 47 per
cent in a statutory merger was exempt. (2 P.H. CAP. ADJUSTMENTS 5595).
28. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 112(g) (1), 53 Stat. 40.
29. § 368(a) (1) (B).
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required to continue meaningful voting control in the acquiring cor-
poration, a requirement that all the former shareholders who con-
stituted the controlling eighty per cent group must retain their manage-
ment interest by receiving voting stock in the acquirer becomes hard
to justify. Therefore, if some of them sold their stock at an earlier date
for cash or non-voting stock, their lack of a continued voting interest
would seem irrelevant to the other shareholders. As long as a particular
shareholder received solely voting stock, and the acquirer obtained
eighty per cent ownership, it would seem reasonable to grant exemption to
that shareholder."
This rationale for exempting "creeping mergers" has not been
rigorously pursued in the Code anymore than the continuity of interest
requirements have been coherently developed. The exemption for a share-
holder still depends upon all shareholders receiving solely voting stock
in the transaction which provides the acquirer with eighty per cent owner-
ship. Only the consideration received in an earlier Unsrelated transaction is
disregarded."'
The identification of transactions which are part of the plan for tax
purposes is obviously difficult. There are indications that no rulings will
be issued excluding a transaction from a plan if it occurs within six
months of another sale and that the Internal Revenue Service views trans-
actions within two years of each other as presumptively part of a plan. 2
In addition to limiting the exemption of creeping acquisitions in an
irrational manner, the 1954 Code has explicitly granted this exemption
only to stock-for-stock mergers, not to the statutory merger or the
asset merger. The Service has ruled, however, that a statutory merger
will be exempt despite earlier unrelated acquisitions, 3 and the Regula-
tions appear to reach the same result if the acquirer already has eighty
30. This "per shareholder" approach was referred to as "extreme" in AL, FEDERAL
INCOME ESTATE AND GIFr TAX PROJECT, INCOME TAX PROBLEMS OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS, 302 (Oct. 31, 1958) (Report of Working Views of ALI-ABA Study).
A Subcommittee of the Advisory Group on Subchapter C to the House Ways and
Means Committee suggested that as long as the individual shareholder received property
with the required continuity, defined to allow some non-equity, he should be exempt if
the acquirer had control of the target after the exchange. REPORT ON CORPORATE DISTmIBU-
TIONS AND ADJUSTMENTS FROM THE ADVISORY GROUP ON SUBCHAPTER C, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. 64 (Comm. Print 1957).
31. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955).
32. 27 J. TAXATION 253 (Oct. 1967). The denial of a ruling when one transaction
might destroy exemption for another transaction should not be confused with the provi-
sion in the Regulations which suggests that a sale for voting stock is entitled to exemp-
tion as part of a plan which later results in 80 per cent control within a 12-month period;
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955).
33. Rev. Rul. 58-93, 1958-1 Cumi. BuL.. 188.
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per cent of the target. 4 However, an asset acquisition is apparently
not exempt if the acquirer previously bought a significant amount of
stock in an unrelated transaction."5
The creeping acquisition rules are important in those conglomerate
acquisitions which proceed by tender offer to shareholders, rather than
by the statutory merger route. If earlier acquisitions for non-voting
equity, debt or cash were deemed part of the plan of acquisition for tax
purposes, the later acquisition for voting stock could not be exempt since
only voting stock can be used in a stock-for-stock acquisition." Earlier
sales for voting stock, however, might be exempt if followed at a later
date by a further acquisition for voting stock which gives the acquirer
eighty per cent control. Any promises, however, to the earlier sellers that
they are or are not part of the plan are unreliable in the absence of a ruling
from the Service."
The 1954 Code added one further provision which can be of
significance in conglomerate acquisitions. Prior to 1954 taxpayers had
developed a technique to obtain cash at capital gains rates without
diluting their common equity position.3 8  Preferred stock would be
distributed to common shareholders. This distribution was tax-free since
stock dividends were taxed under the 1939 Code only if they were
disproportionate.3 9 The preferred stock was normally a capital asset and
its sale was taxed at capital gains rates. The 1954 Code sought to curb
this abuse by tainting certain preferred stock so that the proceeds received
on its sale would be taxed as ordinary income.4 It further provided that
preferred stock received in tax-exempt mergers could also be tainted if
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.332-2(d) (1955). The thrust of the regulation is to exempt
minority shareholders of the target since the acquiring corporation is already exempt
(§ 332) and receives a carryover of the transferor's basis under § 334(b) (1), a result
which parallels the reorganization provisions. A critique of the irrationality of the ac-
quiring corporation's disappearing basis appears in Seplow, Acquisition of Assets of a
Subsidiary; Liquidation or Reorganization, 73 HARV. L. REv. 484 (1960).
35. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1959) ; Rev.
Rul. 57-278, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 124.
36. Solitron had bought less than one per cent of Amphenol for cash. It later of-
fered voting stock for the remaining interest, but a shareholder of the target obtained a
ruling that the earlier cash acquisition was part of the plan which would render subse-
quent sales taxable; 28 J. TAXATION 319 (May 1968).
37. Zapata Norress sought a ruling that a prior stock acquisition followed by a
statutory merger was tax exempt on the theory that the prior equity was received as part
of the plan to be consummated by the later statutory merger. Its purpose was to en-
courage the recipients of the tender offer to sell. 31 J. TAXATION 319 (Nov. 1969).
38. See Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 918 (1954).
39. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943) ; Strassburger v. Commissioner, 318
U.S. 604 (1943).
40. § 306.
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similar possibilities of abuse were present.4 In conglomerate acquisitions
the taint is often avoided because the stock is usually issued by public
corporations whose shareholders are thought to be less likely to receive
preferred stock to accomplish the bail-out of earnings described above42
and because the preferred stock is usually a significant percentage of the
consideration received, a factor associated more with an investment
intent rather than an intent to sell.4
The picture of the rule-making process that emerges from this history
is one of both judicial and legislative confusion." Mechanical judicial
interpretation failed to implement the original purpose of the statute,
and Congressional tinkering and legislative detail obscured that purpose
further. Once Congress created a patchwork of statutory rules, the courts
can probably be excused if their decisions appear to lack coherence. For
example, how is a court to decide whether a stock acquisition followed
by a liquidation should be analyzed as a stock or asset acquisition?"
In this context, easy reliance on the "step transaction" approach is clearly
an "anodyne for the pain of reasoning."4 " In one formulation, the step
transaction approach requires an intermediate step to be disregarded if
it serves no function in the light of the ultimate goal." When a liquida-
tion follows a stock acquisition, the stock acquisition is a meaningless
step to the acquirer who wants the assets, but it is crucial to the seller
whose votes for an asset acquisition were withheld thereby forcing resort
to the stock acquisition route. From whose point of view is one to
decide whether the intermediate step is meaningless? Another formula-
tion of the step transaction doctrine"8 requires that the intermediate step
41. § 356(c) (1) (B).
42. In the ITT acquisition of Sheraton, where 14.86 per cent of the consideration
was preferred stock, the Service ruled that the preferred stock was § 306 stock but that
its disposition would not be tainted with ordinary income treatment. 2 P.H. CAP. ADJUST-
MENTS 5977.
43. When ITT acquired Rayonier, 55.46 per cent of the consideration was preferred
stock and the Service held that it did not constitute § 306 stock. 2 P.H. ADJUSTMENTS
5928.
44. PAUL, supra note 24, referred to a "confused Congress" passing the Revenue
Act of 1934.
45. The continuity rules are different. A stock acquisition admits of only voting
stock where an asset acquisition can be exempt despite a limited amount of boot (see note
20 supra) ; on the other hand, a creeping stock acquisition is exempt but a creeping asset
acquisition is not. See notes supra 29 and 35. See American Potash & Chemical Corp.
v. U.S., 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968), petition for rehearing granted, 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct.
Cl. 1968) where the court has found it difficult to decide whether to analyze the trans-
action as a stock or an asset acquisition.
46. The phrase is Learned Hand's in Sansome v. Commissioner. 60 F.2d 931, 933
2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 667 (1932).
47. R. PAUL & P. ZIMET, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAX-
ATION (2d Series) 200 (1939).
48. Blum, Motive, Intent and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CXi. L.
REv. 485, 530-31 (1967).
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be disregarded if it was part of a larger plan. But this formulation gives
little guidance. For example, the issuance of fractional shares is recogniz-
ed as a separate step in a merger despite an immediate redemption in
accordance with the plan." A better, but unsettling, statement of the
step transaction rule is that the intermediate step is recognized if there
is a discernible policy in the tax law that it be recognized. Thus, fractional
shares are given independent significance despite subsequent redemption
since to disregard the step would interfere with a common and useful
business technique. However, no guidance is given by the tax law in the
case of a stock acquisition followed by a liquidation since there is no
evidence whether the rules applicable to stock or asset acquisitions should
prevail.
This discussion of the rule-making process leads to the preliminary
conclusion that the courts and the Treasury are more suitable agencies
for developing the tax law rationally than the legislature and that, had
they done so, legislation in this area might not have developed into its
current incoherent state. 50
Recent efforts to change the law concerning tax-exempt mergers
have focused on Congress. On the one hand, it has been proposed that
the present law be changed to require a significant continuity of interest
amounting to twenty per cent of the acquirer's equity"' and, on the other
hand, to abandon the continuity requirement still further for a per-
shareholder approach.52 The exemption continues to thrive on the worn-
out rhetoric of continuity. Little thought is given to whether the ex-
emption provisions are now economically justified."3 Thus, when the
House proposed requiring twenty per cent continuity in 1954, it exempted
49. See Mills v. Commissioner, 331 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1964) ; Rev. Rul. 66-365,
1966-2 Cum. BULL. 116.
50. For example, the problem of statutory mergers into subsidiaries (see note 25
supra) could have been handled by treating the transaction as a merger into the parent
followed by a transfer to the subsidiary; see Rev. Rul. 64-73, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 142,
treating a conveyance to a sub-sub-subsidiary as a conveyance to a sub-subsidiary
followed by a transfer to the remote subsidiary.
51. See ALI, 2 FEDERAL INCOME STAT. §§ 601 (a) (2) and 602(a) (2) (Feb. 1954
draft) ; the requisite continuity could have been provided by a 20 per cent voting interest
without regard to the stock's participation in profits. Id. at 310-11 and 311-13. The
1954 House Bill which developed into the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 contained a re-
quirement that there be 20 per cent participation in the profits (H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 40), which the Senate deleted; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 52,
53 (1954).
52. See note 30 supra.
53. Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue Sheldon S. Cohen has urged a re-
view of the merger provisions on economic grounds in Conglomerate Mergers & Taxa-
tion, 55 A.B.A.J. 40 (1969) ; see also Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganiza-
tions," 38 COLU-M. L. REV. 98 (1938).
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mergers of public companies.5" Apparently, the complexity of the Code
has not only confused its interpreters but has channeled all efforts
towards its more systematic application rather than a re-examination
of the premises on which it is based.
B. DEBT AND ORIGINAL ISSUE DiscouNir
It has already been noted that in a statutory merger a limited amount
of debt can be received without destroying the exemption for equity, but
that the debt might be taxed as a dividend." This section deals with
installment sales and original issue discount rules which encourage the
use of debt to purchase stock other than in a tax-exempt merger. The
confusion and complexity in these areas is negligible compared with
the law of exempt mergers. They will be discussed here primarily to pro-
vide a background for comparing the changes in the Tax Reform Act
which rationalize the law of installment sales and original issue discount
with the complex changes dealing with interest on debt issued by
corporate acquirers.
If an individual makes a casual sale of personal property on credit
for more than one thousand dollars, he can elect to postpone recognition of
gain until he receives payment other than in the form of the debtor's pro-
mise or note.5" This rule had its origin in a Treasury Regulation57 allow-
ing the taxpayer to report as income the portion of each installment re-
ceived equal to the total gain on the transaction divided by the total con-
tract price. 8 Thus, if property with a cost of sixty dollars is sold for one
hundred dollars in four equal installments, each twenty-five dollar install-
ment results in recognition of one quarter of the forty dollar gain, i.e. ten
dollars. 5 The deferral of tax under these circumstances is related in ration-
ale to the deferral which was once allowed if the proceeds had no readily
realizable value. Both rules reflect a desire to avoid imposing a tax while
the actual receipt of gain is too speculative.6" Unlike the merger provisions,
54. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1954).
55. See note 16 supra.
56. § 453(b) (1) (B).
57. See note 2 supra. From 1921-24 the non-taxability of proceeds lacking a readily
realizable marketable value might have provided a statutory base for exemption of the
debt in many cases (see notes 7 and 8 supra).
58. § 453(a) and (b).
59. The example assumes that the interest paid is sufficient to avoid imputing a
portion of the sales proceeds to interest under § 483.
60. The pervasiveness of the idea that the appropriate time to impose tax is the
receipt of property having a readily realizable value is evidenced by its cropping up in
unexpected places: (1) cash receipts are usually taxed to accrual basis taxpayers despite
matching costs to be incurred in later years. Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128
(1963) (service business) ; but see Artnell Co. v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981, 984 (8th
Cir. 1968) (if amount and time of future costs are certain, deferral might be allowed) ;
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however, there is no doubt that the seller has realized gain or loss on the
transaction. The installment method is only a method of postponing the re-
cognition of income until a later date. Therefore, gain cannot be given
away in many cases where it could have been deflected to the donee if the
property had been received in a tax-exempt merger. For example, if the
debt on which no tax is paid is given to a relative during the donor's
life, the postponement of gain ceases;61 whereas if stock received in an
exempt merger were given away, the entire gain would be taxed to the
donee. 2
Since the installment method is intended to relieve the taxpayer of
the burden of tax when receipt of the proceeds is doubtful, it is unavail-
able if a substantial percentage of the price is paid in the first year." The
rule not only identifies cases where there has been a collection of a
significant amount of the consideration but also those cases where the
initial payment is some evidence that subsequent payments will be made. 4
The postponement of tax on corporate debt probably represents a
corruption of the original purpose of the installment sales rules, at least
if the debtor were solvent. The elimination of the deferral of gain when
certain corporate debt is received is one of the changes made by the Tax
Reform Act to be discussed below. 5
From the buyer's point of view, a transaction is a taxable purchase
when debt is the sole consideration. The buyer, therefore, obtains a new
cost basis for the property purchased. The combination of a higher basis
for the buyer and deferral for the seller often makes the use of debt an
(2) A seller of real estate is taxed on the fair market value of the buyer's obligation
even if the seller reports income on the accrual method; Treas. Reg. § 1.453-6(a) (1)
(1958) ; (3) cash basis taxpayers must report gain in the year of sale when they receive
only a promise of an annuity from a corporation, trust, fund or foundation. Rev. Rul.
62-136, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 12.
61. § 453(d).
62. Section 1015(a) can be cited for the donor's exclusion although it would prob-
ably be supported as a gloss on § 61. Election of the installment sales provision also
eliminates the stepped-up basis at death; §§ 691(a) (4) and 1014(a), (c).
63. An excess of 30 per cent is the current criterion; § 453(b) (2) (A).
64. The Revenue Act of 1928, § 44(b), 45 Stat. 805, raised the amount of down pay-
ment which could be received from 25 per cent to 40 per cent since the higher figure was
greater assurance of actual payment of the remainder; H.R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. 14-16, reprinted in, 1939-1 (Part 2) Cum. BULL. 393. A recent ruling requires that
there be at least two payments to qualify under § 453; Rev. Rul. 69-462 Cum. BULL. 7. The
case law background preceding this ruling is discussed in Appert, Installment Reporting
as a Substitute for a Tax-Free Reorganization, 22 TAX LAWYER 137, 139-47 (1968).
65. The House Report on the Tax Reform Act suggests that there was some doubt
about corporate debt being eligible for § 453(b) treatment under prior law, implying that
the statute might have been limited in much the same manner that the continuity of in-
terest rules were developed; H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 107
(1969). See also Bittker, Proposed Legislative Restrictions on Acquisitions of Stock by
Conglomerate Corporations, 30 J. TAXATION 354, 357 (1969).
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attractive alternative to a tax-exempt merger during a period of rising
prices.
The existence of original issue discount on the issuance of debt
affects both the seller and the buyer and is a further factor to be con-
sidered in our examination of conglomerate acquisitions. A simple
example of original issue discount is the issuance of debt with a hundred
dollar face amount for ninety dollars cash. The ten dollar difference is in
effect a deferred interest payment and is referred to as original issue
discount. The buyer normally deducts such discount by accruing a
deduction over the life of the debt.66 Until the Tax Reform Act, how-
ever, the seller did not report the accured interest in the form of original
issue discount until the sale or redemption of the debt unless the seller
was a financial institution or similar investor who reported income on
an accrual basis.67 There are several uncertainties in determining the
existence of original issue discount. First, can there be original issue dis-
count when property is sold for debt? Case law is conflicting, and the new
law tries to resolve the issue in a manner discussed below.68
Second, can there be original issue discount if the seller elects to be
taxed under the installment method? One commentator has suggested
that there can be no original issue discount in such cases because the full
amount realized upon dispositon of the debt is treated as proceeds of the
sale of the property originally exchanged for the debt thereby leaving
no amount which could be taxed as original issue discount.69 This
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(a) (1968).
67. See de Kosmian, Original Issue Discount, 22 TAx LAW-ER 339, 345-47 (1969).
The Tax Reform Act changes are discussed more fully in Part IIA of the text. The
statutory pattern of § 1232 since 1954 and prior to the Tax Reform Act was to deny
capital asset status for the debt but to treat the transaction as a sale or exchange if the
debt was held more than 6 months. Presumably, the pre-1954 case law still applied to
debt held 6 months or less. Thus, since United States v. Midland Ross Corp., 381 U.S.
54 (1965) treated the amount received for original issue discount under the 1939 Code
as ordinary income which was not sales proceeds, the gain attributable to original issue
discount on debt held for 6 months or less was not taxable as short-term capital gain
since capital gains are realized only upon a sale or exchange; § 1222. Therefore, the ordi-
nary income cannot be reduced by capital losses (§ 1211). This analysis is still applicable
to debt held for six months or less after the Tax Reform Act.
68. Finding discount: Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1962) ; American Smelting & Refining Co. v. United States, 130 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1942).
Finding no discount: Southern Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1222 (Ct. Cf.
1969) ; Paine v. Commissioner, 236 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Montana Power Co. v.
United States, 159 F. Supp. 593 (Ct. Cl. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 842 (1958).
Whether there is original issue discount upon redemption of stock in the corporation is-
suing debt is a problem which the new statute, dealing with sale of property for debt,
should not be interpreted to resolve (see note 136 infra).
69. See de Kosmian, supra note 67 at 352-54. He notes a Treasury argument (in-
tended to persuade Congress to pass the imputed interest rules now found in § 483) which
assumed that a sale under the installment method authorized by § 453 contained no in-
terest element if property worth 1,000 dollars was sold for 1,300 dollars. But there is
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reasoning leads to an anomalous result since it would allow the buyer
to deduct the discount as interest while the seller reported the discount
as sales proceeds. A better solution which the statute can certainly bear
is to treat the amount realized on the disposition of the debt by the
creditor as proceeds from the sale of the original property only to the
extent that the face value of the debt is not attributable to original issue
discount. Whenever there is imputed interest under section 483 the
proceeds of the sale are adjusted downwards for purposes of the install-
ment sales provisions to reflect that portion which is imputed interest.7"
A similar adjustment should be made when the sale is to a corporation
and there is original issue discount.7'
II. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 AND CONGLOMERATE
ACQUISITIONS
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 contains a number of provisions
intended to modify some of the rules discussed above and, therefore,
presents an opportunity for examining the legislative process in greater
detail. President Johnson's tax reform proposals contained nothing which
purported to deal with conglomerate acquisitions." In February, 1969,
Chairman Mills of the House Ways and Means Committee introduced a
bill7 which dealt with the deductibility of interest on debt related to
certain acquisitions and with the eligibility of corporate debt for deferral
under the installment method. The bill provided that if over thirty-five per
cent of the consideration paid for stock was debt or property attributable
to borrowing (e.g. cash borrowed from a bank), then a percentage of
the interest was not deductible. It also eliminated the installment method
when corporate debt was issued in registered form or with coupons
attached.
When the Tax Reform Bill finally passed the House, it had acquired
a third provision dealing with original issue discount.74 This provision
nothing in the Treasury statement to suggest that the buyer was a corporation which
could have been covered by the original issue discount provisions.
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.453-1(b) (2) (1966).
71. The imputed interest provisions should not preclude a larger interest imputation
under the original issue discount rules when a sale is made to a corporation. See de
Kosmian, supra note 67, at 351-52; Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(b) (3) (1966).
72. U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT, JOINT PUBLICATION OF HOUSE CoAtMi'rEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS AND SENATE FINANCE COM-MITTEE, TAX REFOR-M STUDIES AND PROPO-
SALS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1969).
73. H.R. 7489, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (hereinafter cited as Mills bill).
74. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 413, 229-37 (August 8, 1969) (hereinafter
cited as House Version). The bill as passed appears in §§ 1232(a) (3), (b) (2) and
6049(a) (1) (C).
RULE-MAKING PROCESS
required lenders to accrue original issue discount periodically in all cases
and required borrowers to report the interest attributable to original issue
discount if the debt was in registered form. It also clarified the law by
affirming that a sale of property for corporate debt can have original
issue discount 5 and by confirming recent regulations that there could be
original issue discount when corporate debt and warrants were issued.7
The provisions dealing with the deferral of corporate debt under
the installment method and with original issue discount went through
both the House and Senate without difficulty. They had both received
support in the Nixon Tax Reform proposals.77 The only modifications
made were to refine the bill to accomplish its purpose more accurately.
First, corporate debt was ineligible for deferral not only if it was
registered or had coupons attached, but also if it was readily tradable in
an established securities market." Second, original issue discount could
exist upon a sale of property only if either the property or the debt was
traded on an established securities market thereby restricting original
issue discount to cases where the valuation problems were not likely to
be too formidable.7" In both cases the legislative process worked smoothly
since the bill eliminated certain irrationalities in the development of
areas of the law which were relatively uncluttered. It is important to
remember, however, that the impetus did not come from a desire to
rationalize the law but from hostility to conglomerate acquisitions which
were thought to be encouraged by a seller's ability to defer tax on the
proceeds of a sale and to evade tax on original issue discount."0 This
observation should give pause to a judge or Treasury official who
hesitates to play a role in developing the tax law because he believes that
75. See note 68 supra. House Version. at 235.
76. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b) (2) (1968). House Version at 235.
77. President Nixon's Tax Reform Proposals presented to House Ways and Means
Comm., Vol. 14 of House Hearings at 5158-62.
78. "ne House version added to the Mills bill the cateiory of "readily tradable"
security (House Version at 228), and the Senate Finance Committee limited the loss of
the installment method to situations where the registered debt was readily tradable; H.R.
13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 412, 284-85 (Nov. 21, 1969) (hereinafter cited as Senate Fi-
nance Committee Version). The Senate Finance Committee version also deleted (at 284-
85) a rule imposed by the House version (at 227-28) that payments had to be periodic.
The bill as passed appears in § 453 (b) (3).
79. This provision emerged after floor debate in the Senate; H.R. 13270, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., § 413, 307-08 (Dec. 11, 1969) (hereinafter cited as Senate Version). The bill
as passed appears in § 1232(b) (2).
The original issue discount rules refer to trading on an established securities market,
whereas the installment debt rules refer to trading in a market. The difference is prob-
ably between securities registered on an exchange and trading in the over-the-counter
market.
80. H.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 103, 107-08 and 109 (1969);
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 144-45 and 146-47 (1969).
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Congress is ready and waiting to perform that task.
The legislative process behaved very differently in developing the
new section dealing with the disallowance of an interest deduction on
debt used in certain acquisitions. As the Mills bill passed through the
House Ways and Means Committee its contours changed considerably
with the addition of detailed elaboration and exceptions. The Nixon pro-
posals had contained no similar section dealing with an interest deduc-
tion. The Treasury's view was that the problem was essentially that of
distinguishing between debt and equity and was, therefore, best dealt with
through Treasury Regulations. 8 As in 1934, however, Congress turned
down the invitation to refrain from acting.
The first change was to eliminate the requirement that thirty-five per
cent of the consideration be debt. It was noted in the House Hearings
that one offeror had simply replaced the debt with preferred stock to the
extent necessary to avoid the new rules.8"
Second, a number of provisions were added which purported to
focus the law on those conglomerate acquisitions in which the issuance
of debt raised questions of the borrower's financial stability. The interest
deduction would be disallowed only if the debt were issued to a seller
since a bank could presumably determine financial viability.Y The
debt/equity ratio or projected earnings/interest ratio of the borrower
had to indicate a lack of cushion for the debt."4 The debt had to be
subordinated to certain creditors.8" An exception was introduced if the
interest on acquisitions did not exceed five million dollars, which was
intended to eliminate the application of the new law to the acquisition of
small businesses by other small businesses or by employees to whom
management wanted to sell; both these situations were presumably cases
where the buyers could handle themselves without the protection of the
tax law.86
81. See note 77 supra at 5054.
82. Hoise Hearings at 2462 and 2485.
83. House Version at 220; House Hearings at 2451 and 2517; § 279(b) (1) ("issued
to provide consideration").
84. House Version at 221 ; House Hearings at 2377-79 and 2463; § 279(b) (4). The
final bill responded to a request made to the Senate Finance Committee (Hearings on the
Subject of Tax Reform before Senate Finance Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4164 (1969))
that cash flow be more closely approximated by adding depreciation to earnings and
profits in determining projected earnings; see § 279(c) (3) (B) (ii). Strangely, this pro-
vision had not appeared in any of the versions of the bill prior to conference committee
action.
85. The Senate Finance version (at 274-75) expanded the creditors to whom the
debt could be subordinated from trade creditors to, in the alternative, a substantial amount
of unsecured creditors; see § 279(b) (2).
86. House Version at 219; House Hearings at 2510 (small acquirer) and 2515-16
(employee buy-outs) ; § 279 (a) (1). The 5 million dollar exemption is reduced by in-
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Third, the interest had to be issued on debt which created public
confusion about the value of the consideration. The above rules on
financial stability were partly designed to protect the public from being
misled. Another provision with this objective requires the debt to be
issued with warrants or a conversion privilege before the interest deduc-
tion is disallowed.
7
The House Ways and Means Committee asserted that it was refining
the definition of debt and equity.8 One Congressman felt that if the
public viewed convertible debt or a debt-warrants package as equity
then that assessment was probably accurate.88 However, despite the claim
that the new interest rules were intended to restore the law to its
original purpose by refining a well recognized distinction, it is hard to
view the new law as genuinely seeking to accomplish that purpose. When
the Senate added a provision to the bill explicitly authorizing regula-
tions to distinguish between debt and equity, it specified that the
criteria developed by the House to deal with interest on debt used in
acquisitions did not bind the Treasury in developing rules to make that
distinction.9 Certainly, on the merits, it is difficult to see how the
opportunity to exchange a fixed claim for a more uncertain claim which
is more dependent on future profits can make the borrower's obligation
less like interest while it is outstanding.92
The bill which finally emerged appeared, therefore, not merely as
an attack on conglomerate acquisitions generally but as an attack on
a sub-category of conglomerate acquisitions; viz., only those involving
financially shaky buyers whose offers would confuse the public. However,
there are some attributes of the new rules which seem not to fit this neat
terest on any debt issued to the seller of certain interests in other corporations after
December 31, 1967, even if the debt is not subordinated or has an adequate cushion; the
December 31, 1967, date was added by the Senate Finance Committee version (at 273-74).
87. House Version at 220-21; House Hearings at 2367-77, 2371-72, 2385, 2462;
§ 279(b) (3).
88. I.R. REP. No. 91-413 (Part I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1969).
89. House Hearings at 2371-72 (ranking minority member Byrnes).
90. Senate Finance Committee Version, § 415 at 296-97. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 385 (1969).
91. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 138-39 (1969). For example, non-
resident aliens would still obtain the treaty benefits available to interest. Investors
would have to accrue original issue discount (note 74 supra).
92. Congressman Byrnes (see note 89 supra at 2372) suggested that the convertible
debt used in acquisitions was never intended to remain outstanding in view of the callabil-
ity feature which would force the investor to exercise his option or give up the debt in-
vestment. However, this comment applies only if the debt is (1) callable and (2) either
convertible 6r usable to acquire stock with the warrants. Furthermore, it only proves
that the investor is likely to have a concern with future growth more analogous to a
shareholder than a bondholder, not that the return on the investment is a dividend Drior
to the change in status.
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explanation of its purpose, such as the 2/1 ratio of debt to equity which
supposedly indicates financial instability.93 This suggests that another
purpose may have been hidden in the statute's complexity. In an effort
to determine whether the statute was really directed at its declared
objective, we made a statistical survey of the kinds of consideration used
in conglomerate acquisitions to see what tax considerations, if any, were
most likely to have an influence. The results of that study appear in the
following section.
B. STATISTICS OF CONGLOMERATE ACQUISITIONS
A number of conglomerate acquirers were selected to see what their
offers consisted of. Two lists of conglomerates were chosen from financial
journals. 4 Although this selection process resulted in omitting some
conglomerate corporations from the study, the number of acquirers was
thereby made manageable.
The Wall Street journal and Prentice Hall Capital Adjustments
Reporter were the two sources of data. These sources were searched for
all transactions between January, 1968 and June, 1969 and, in addition,
for those transactions going back to December, 1966 which involved the
conglomerates appearing on the lists chosen and which were also on a list
of tender offers presented to the House Ways and Means Committee."5
Answers to the following questions were sought: (1) How often
were tax exempt statutory mergers completed and did preferred stock
figure prominently in such transactions? (2) When did the installment
method and the interest deduction play a role in encouraging the use of
debt in conglomerate acquisitions under circumstances where the new
rules would eliminate the tax benefits? The data indicates that exempt
statutory mergers using preferred stock were far more frequently used
93. When the Advisory Group proposed to define the ratio which would result in
treating debt as equity, they suggested 5/1; SUMMARY OF THE SUBCHAPTER C ADVISORY
GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS ON CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION AND ADJUSTMrENTS, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (Comm. Print 1959). The ALI-ABA study suggested a minimum of 3T/2 to
1 (supra note 30 at 436).
94. Smith & Schreiner, A Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Diversification, 24
J. FINANCE 413, 423 (1969): A. J. Industries; Automatic Sprinkler; Bangor Punta; Bell
Intercontinental; Eagle Picher Industries; Foremost-McKesson; Glen Alden; Gulf &
Western; International Tel. & Tel. (hereinafter referred to as ITT) ; Ling-Tempco-
Vought (hereinafter referred to as LTV); Lehigh Valley Industries; Litton; North
American Rockwell; Ogden; Studebaker-Worthington; Teledyne; Tenneco; Textron;
Whittaker. The following additional conglomerates (not already listed in the previous
source) are from FINANCE WORLD 12 (May 14, 1969) : AMK; Avco; Avnet; City Invest-
ing; Colt Industries; Commonwealth United; Fuqua Industries; Indian Head; Kidde;
Loew's; National General; National Industries; Northwest Industries; Republic; U.S.
Industries.
95. House Hearings at 2489.
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in conglomerate acquisitions than taxable debt; and that the tax benefits
relating to the use of debt which have been eliminated by the new law
were not a significant factor in conglomerate acquisitions.
Sixty-eight exempt statutory mergers were identified for which
satisfactorily complete data was available.98 In thirty-seven of them,9 7
solely voting common stock98 was used to acquire the target's common
stock. In another twenty-five acquisitions, some or all of the considera-
tion was preferred stock.99 In five more acquisitions, a merger using
preferred stock followed an earlier purchase of a minority interest for
cash."' Only one example was found where an exemption for a statutory
merger was claimed after more than majority control was acquired for
cash, presumably because of the likelihood that the earlier cash sale would
be considered part of the later merger, thereby preventing the required
96. The transactions are listed in notes 97, 99, 100, 101 infra.
In many cases we identified a transaction as a statutory merger because shareholders
of both corporations had to vote. In other cases, we assumed that the statutory merger
route was followed since the newspaper used the term "merged" or "acquired" and there
were no signs of resistance. When preferred stock was used as consideration, the plausi-
bility of the above assumption is increased because exemption is only available for non-
voting preferred in a statutory merger; although the newspaper did not specify whether
preferred stock was voting or non-voting, we assume it was non-voting stock.
If the consideration was unspecified or the results of an offer or agreement were not
reported, the transaction was omitted. Since many of these transactions were probably
consummated as statutory mergers the data most likely understates the use of this acqui-
sition technique.
97. Automatic Sprinkler-George J. Meyer; Bangor Punta-Connell; Colt-Cen-
tral Transformer; Commonwealth United-Berry Petroleum; Commonwealth United-
Television Enterprises Corp.; Fuqua-Ward Mfg.; Fuqua-Pacemaker Corp.; .Gulf &
Western-Res-ource Publications; Indian Head-Longwood Machine Works; ITT-
Levitt & Sons; ITT-Yellow Cab Co. of Kansas City; Kidde-Harrington and Richard-
son; National Industries-Retail Centers; Ogden-Bulk Transport; Republic-National
Airmotive; Republic-Kentucky Electric Steel; Republic-Mansbach Metal; Republic-
Polan Industries; Teledyne-Rodney; Teledyne-Hastings-Rayquist; Teledyne-Packard
Bell; Teledyne-Ohio Steel Foundry; Tenneco--Mechanex; U.S. Industries-Missel
Corp.; U.S. Industries-Capital Wire and Cable; U.S. Industries-Central Industries,
Inc.; U.S. Industries-B.H. Rite Baby Carriage; U.S. Industries-I. Appel; U.S. Indus-
tries-Southeastern Metals; U.S. Industries-Mobile Homes; Whittaker-Nautec; Whit-
taker-Tee Thermo Plastics; Whittaker-Radiotronics; Whittaker-May Aluminum;
Whittaker-Suval; Whittaker-Fanon; Whittaker-Compass Container.
98. If the newspaper referred only to "stock" of the acquirer, we assumed it was
voting common stock.
99. Avnet-Carol Wire and Cable; Gulf & Western-Consolidated Cigar (tax-
able boot also received); Gulf & Western-Universal American Corporation; Gulf &
Western-Bliss; ITT-Sheraton; ITT-Rayonier; ITT-Pennsylvania Glass; ITT-
Continental Baking; ITT-Grinell; ITT-Thorp Finance; ITT-Canteen; Litton-
Landis Tool; Litton-UTD; National Industries-Colt; Teledyne-Landis Machine;
Teledyne-Argonaut; Tenneco-Kern County; Textron-Fafnir Bearing; Textron-
Polaris; Textron-Talon; U.S. Industries-Jane Colby; U.S. Industries-Strolee; U.S.
Industries-Gloray Knitting Mills; U.S. Industries-Citizens Mortgage; Whittaker-
Long Lok.
100. Bangor Punta--Waukesha; Kidde-U.S. Lines; U.S. Industries-Wyatt; Colt
-Crucible; National Industries-Crescent.
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continuity of interest." 1
Debt was used to acquire control in eleven cases." 2 The installment
method of taxation was apparently available in five cases.' In two cases,
convertibility made the use of the installment method doubtful in view of
the Service's rumored position that convertibility creates an uncertainity
in the value of the sales proceeds which makes the installment method
unavailable.' In three cases, the percentage of non-debt exceeded thirty
per cent thereby preventing the election of the installment method.0 5
In one transaction, we could not determine the percentage of the down
payment.
0 6
The deduction for interest in circumstances where it would now be
denied was apparently available in no more than four of the eleven cases.
In eight of the eleven cases, the debt was issued with either a conver-
sion privilege or warrants. 7 thereby presenting the possibility that the
new rules would disallow the deduction. The data presented to the House
Ways and Means Committee on the debt/equity ratio of acquirers
indicates, however, that only four of the eight transactions involved
acquirers with inadequate equity cushions.' 8 The information on sub-
101. LTV-Wilson involved a 53 per cent cash acquisition followed by a statutory
merger alleged to be exempt although the merger followed the cash acquisition by no
more than 5 months.
Acquisitions for stock paid directly to selling shareholders were comparatively rare,
perhaps because of the unlikelihood of exemption. The following are illustrative: City
Investing-General Development Corp. (at least 49 per cent acquired) ; City Investing-
Home Insurance (acquired over 80 per cent; counsel advised that exchange exempt,
from which it can be inferred that the preferred stock offered was voting preferred) ;
Gulf & Western-Security Insurance (unsuccessful offer of preferred contingent on
receipt of 80 per cent of target; the 80 per cent goal might not indicate the desire for an
exempt acquisition since there is no suggestion that the preferred was voting stock; an-
other tax reason for seeking 80 per cent is the availability of tax free dividends from the
target-subsidiary (§ 243(a) (2) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-14(a) (1) (1966)); Northwest
-Chicago, Milwaukee R.R. (88 per cent acquired; probably an exempt stock-for-stock
merger) ; Avco-Embassey (target became a subsidiary; might have been an exempt
stock-for-stock merger if the preferred offered was voting stock; the target was owned
primarily by one family firm).
102. The transactions are listed in notes 103-06 infra.
103. Gulf & Western-Brown (counsel's opinion suggests availability of the install-
ment method), LTV-Greatamerica (counsel's opinion claims availability of installment
method if warrants' value not excessive) ; Loew's-Lorillard (same); Glen Alden-
Schenley (counsel's opinion suggests availability); Tenneco-Newport News (counsel's
opinion claims availability of installment method if common stock's value not excessive).
104. See note 158 infra. Gulf & Western-Associates Investment Co. (counsel's
opinion nonetheless suggested installment method available); Avco-Seabord (same).
105. Fuqua-Interstate Motor; AMK-United Fruit; National General-Great
American Holdings.
106. U.S. Industries-Rau Fastener.
107. These were the transactions listed in notes 103 (except Tenneco-Newport
News and Glen Alden-Schenley) and in 104 and 105 supra.
108. Gulf & Western (2 transactions), Avco and LTV. The data on equity
RULE-MAKING PROCESS
ordination of the debt is incomplete, but it appears that the debt was
usually subordinated.' 9 Data on the earnings/interest ratio was not
before the Committee and the question was not pursued.
Debt was used in three other transactions which cannot clearly be
described as successful or unsuccessful. In one case, the offeror got thirty-
three per cent before selling out.' 9 In another, the acquisition was tied
up in antitrust litigation before it finally collapsed."' In a third case,"'
the offer which included both debt and equity seems to have prevailed over
an equity--cash offer after a long battle. In all three cases the installment
method would not have been available since consideration other than
debt exceeded thirty per cent. An equity option was offered in all three
cases; the debt/equity ratio of the offeror exceeded the 2/1 limit in two
of them." 2
Debt was offered in six unsuccessful attempts to acquire a company
and in five of them an exempt merger prevailed."
Since the lists of conglomerate acquirers which were used in this
study might be considered incomplete, four other tender offer transactions
which were presented to the House Ways and Means Committee were
examined to see if the new interest deduction rules would have had an
effect on successful acquisitions. The data indicates that the new rules
would have had almost no effect. Kinney did not offer any debt in
acquiring Warner Brothers." 4 General Host offered debt to the owner of
Armour but the debt/equity ratio was not over 2/1." Lykes used
cushions does not indicate whether it is based on adjusted basis, fair market value or
book value of the assets; House Hearings at 2378.
109. Five of the 11 successful acquisitions involving debt were described" in a list
presented to the House Ways and Means Committee (House Hearings at 2378) and all
of them involved subordinated debt. Gulf & Western-Brown; Avco-Seabord; LTV
-Greatamerica; AMK-United Fruit; Glen Alden-Schenley.
109a. Gulf & Western-Allis Chalmers.
110. Northwest-Goodrich.
111. Bangor Punta-Piper Aircraft
112. Gulf & Western; Bangor Punta (House Hearings at 2378).
113. Gulf & Western lost to Atlantic Richfield (exempt statutory merger using pre-
ferred) to acquire Sinclair; Loew's lost to Control Data, (exempt statutory merger using
only common) to acquire Commercial Credit; Automatic Sprinkler lost to Jim Walter
(exempt statutory merger using preferred) to acquire U.S. Pipe; Bangor Punta lost to
American Machine and Foundry (exempt statutory merger using only common) to
acquire Harley-Davidson (Bangor Punta also made an exempt offer but it was too late) ;
Northwest Industries lost to City Investing to acquire Home Insurance (counsel for
City Investing advised that offer was tax exempt; apparently offer was for a stock-for-
stock merger). AMK lost to National General to acquire Great American Holdings;
both offered debt.
114. House Hearings at 2378.
115. Id. Although it acquired 57 per cent of the target, the acquirer sold out, per-
haps because without 80 per cent ownership the dividends needed to pay the interest on
the debt would have been taxable (see note 101 .rpra).
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debt to buy a minority interest in Youngstown Sheet and Tube before
entering into an exempt statutory merger; equity options were used with
debt to acquire 23.5 per cent of the target, but debt alone was used to
acquire up to forty-nine per cent control. Crane offered convertible debt
but lost in its efforts to obtain Westinghouse Air Brake to American
Standard's offer of convertible preferred in a tax exempt statutory merger.
C. HIDDEN SPECIAL LEGISLATION
The data indicates that the tax benefits associated with debt which
the new law eliminates were not significant in encouraging conglomerate
acquisitions. The most logical candidate for change in the tax law directed
towards conglomerate acquisitions would have been the exemption for
preferred stock in statutory mergers. This suggests that antitrust pro-
blems were not central to the House Ways and Means Committee's con-
cern. Indeed, there are a number of exceptions in the new law which
give encouragement to conglomerate acquisitions, such as the exception
for interest on debt to acquire eighty per cent ownership if fifty per cent
was owned on October 9, 196911 and the permission to compute the
earning/interest ratio on a consolidated basis if eighty per cent of the
target were later acquired." 7
There is nothing surprising in the conclusion that conglomerate
acquisitions were not the focal point of concern in bringing about the
changes in the rules concerning installment method and original issue
discount, which did no more than rationalize the law. However, the dis-
allowance of the interest deduction purported to derive primary impetus
from economic policy despite suggestions that one purpose was to apply
standards distinguishing between debt and equity.
Anyone contending that conglomerate acquisitions were a major
concern would be compelled to concede that the data showed exempt
statutory mergers to be a far more significant factor in encouraging
successful conglomerate acquisitions than debt, but would assert that there
were really two overriding concerns; viz., conglomerate acquisitions and
acquisitions in which the public was misled by financially shaky debtors.
Indeed, the first witness before the House Ways and Means Committee
was the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, not
the spokesman for the AntiTrust Division of the Department of
justice."' However, the data on public confusion presented to the Com-
116. § 279(i) (2), added by, TAX REFORMt AcT, § 411 (a). This was designed to
help LTV acquire Jones & Loughlin, (House Hearings at 2519) a remarkable feature
for a bill aimed at conglomerate acquisitions.
117. § 279(d) (3), added by, TAX REFORMA Acr, § 411(a).
118. House Hearings at 2363.
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mittee was so unrelated to the data on successful conglomerate acquisi-
tions and the information on financial stability so unrelated to the
strictures of the new law that it seems more likely that this data was used
to encourage acquiescence in a bill with a different design.
First, there were eighty-three tender offers on a list designed to
indicate the prevalent role of debt in offers to the public. Only ten involved
debt offers by conglomerates who are on the lists used in this study and,
of these, only three were successful." 9
Second, another list of twenty-five offers, which was meant to show
the widespread existence of an inadequate cushion for the debt, included
only ten transactions with the proscribed ratio of debt to equity. Of these
ten, only three were offers of debt to the seller directly thereby coming
within the scope of the new rules. 20
The ambiguities of the data presented to the Committee as proof that
financial instability and a misled public were a problem in conglomerate
acquisitions are easily resolved if a different purpose is ascribed to the
law. President McCullough of Collins & Aikman made an appearance
before the House Ways and Means Committee to plead for his company's
freedom. 2' His testimony established that his company was an old and
established business of some 125 years which was being pursued by
Chelsea, a smaller nouveau riche company (founded 1964) which was
119. House Hearings at 2489-90. The successful ones were AMK-United Fruit;
Glen Alden-Schenley; and National General-Great American Holdings. The trans-
actions which were not successful were AMK-Great American Holdings; Automatic
Sprinkler-U.S. Pike & Foundry; Gulf & Western-Allis Chalmers; Gulf & Western-
Sinclair; Loew's-Commercial Credit; Northwest Industries-Home Insurance; North-
west Industries-B. F. Goodrich.
120. House Hearings at 2378. Automatic Sprinkler-Logan (cash); Avco-Sea-
board (cony. debt, debt and warrants); Bangor Punta-Waukesha Motors (cony. pfd.
and common) ; Commonwealth United-Sunasco (pfd.) ; Gulf & Western-Brown (debt
and warrants); Leasco Data Process Equipment Co.-Reliance Insurance Co. (cony.
pfd. and warrants); LTV-Greatamerica (debt and warrants); National Industries-
Crescent (cony. pfd. and common) ; Talley-General Time (not in data) ; Biker Video
-Standard Kollsman (cony. pfd. and warrants).
121. House Hearings at 2460-75. Apparently Northwest's attempt to acquire Good-
rich also provided some impetus for the bill (Senate Hearings at 4159). The Northwest
spokesman pointed out that the interest deduction rules in the Mills bill were directed
solely at stock acquisitions, not asset acquisitions, thereby discriminating against offers
which lacked the consent of management. The House version ultimately applied to asset
acquisitions as well (at 220) and the final bill contains such a provision (§ 279(b) (1)
(B)). However, the role of debt in asset acquisitions is so negligible that the final ver-
sion of the bill which disallows interest deductions in such acquisitions does not over-
come the inference derived from the original version, i.e., that it was intended to protect
management. Of the transactions listed in notes 103-06 only Fuqua-Interstate Motors,
Loew's-Iorillard and Tenneco-Newport News were asset acquisitions for debt. In
only one case might the new law have applied; Tenneco did not offer equity options;
Loew's debt/equity ratio was less than 2/1; Fuqua offered warrants; we have no in-
formation about its debt/equity ratio.
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one-third the target's size. It was Chelsea which had reduced its debt to
less than thirty-five per cent of the consideration to avoid the requirements
in the original bill.'22 The offeror was willing to give a package of debt,
preferred and warrants and its debt/equity ratio was coincidentally
2.08/1.00.123 If the new law is viewed, therefore, as an attempt to
protect established businesses from takeovers by new companies, then the
pieces of the puzzle fit neatly into place. It is not strange to disregard the
use of statutory mergers, to rely on data which inadequately demonstrates
the role of debt in successful conglomerate acquisitions, to encourage
conglomerate acquirers to obtain eighty per cent of the target or to define
an inadequate equity cushion very strictly if the new law is an excise tax
on takeovers of established companies. 24
This invites the question whether the legislative process openly
addressed itself to the economic issues involved in imposing such an
excise tax and to the wisdom of using the income tax to meet whatever
problem was perceived."' The above analysis suggests that it did not.
The data was a smokescreen which created an impression that the
interest deduction provisions had an objective different from their actual
purpose. Congress simply neglected testimony that the economic effects
of the tax benefits withdrawn were highly problematical. 1 26 It is impossible
not to ascribe this style of legislative behavior, at least in part, to the ease
with which the new rules blend innocuously into the statutory labyrinth.
The operation of legislation in serving a narrow spectrum of interests
remains easily hidden except to a few when it is placed in a setting as
complex as the current statute.
D. EXCESsivE DETAIL
The analysis of the legislative process in developing rules for
corporate acquisitions has frequently returned to the problem of exces-
sive statutory detail and the risks it presents of confusing the interpreters
122. House Hearings at 2462.
123. House Hearings at 2463.
124. There is certainly an irony in the sudden punitive use of the tax law for anti-
trust purposes which further suggests an ulterior motive. See, e.g., the provisions to re-
lieve the tax burden when DuPont divested itself of General Motors stock; §§ 301(f),
312(k), 535(f), 543(a) & (d), 545 & 1111. The Tax Reform Act ihas exempted distri-
buting corporations from tax on appreciated property when the distribution is in a re-
demption pursuant to an antitrust decree; § 311 (d) (2) (D), added by, TAX REFoRm Acr,
§ 905 (a).
125. See Sax, The Conglomerate & Tax Reform: A Brief Review, 25 TAx L. RFV.
235 (1969).
126. House Hearings at 2373 (SEC Chairman did not know if interest deduction
encourages acquisition) ; at 2394 (antitrust official will not comment on effect of tax
law) ; at 2490 (representative of T.T. Grimm who supplied the list of tender-offers ac-
knowledged the lack of study of the effects of the tax law).
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of the law and hiding the narrow purposes of proposed legislation. This
section considers this problem more fully. 2 '
Detailed provisions are normally enlisted to accomplish one or more
of three goals. First, they are used to eliminate unintended benefits, i.e.
loopholes. The collapsible corporation provisions 28 and the rules con-
cerning preferred stock 2 ' have this purpose.
Second, the rules may be designed to influence behavior either
favorably, as a subsidy, or unfavorably, as an excise. For example,
section 303 guarantees capital gains treatment so that the tax cost of
certain redemptions after death will not be prohibitive, 8 ' and "Subpart
F" seeks to discourage foreign investment.' 3' The use of detail when the
tax law seeks to effect behavior is, to some extent, impelled by the
institutional limitations of using the tax law in this manner. Generality
in statutory language would seem appropriate only if the administering
agency is capable of making expert judgments in specifically applying the
general provisions. Since the Treasury rarely has that capability, the
alternative usually relied upon is statutory detail which precludes Treasury
discretion but offers some hope of accomplishing the desired objective."3 2
127. We are not concerned with the complexity of record keeping and completing
forms which can be the product of many undetailed rules. The Tax Reform Act has
responded to this problem in a number of ways; § 141(a), (b) and (c) (increased
standard deduction and low income allowances), amended by, TAX REFORM Acr, § 802
(a) ; § 6012 (filing requirements equal level of exempt income) and § 6014(b) (com-
putation of tax by Service), amended by, TAX REFoRm AcT, §§ 941 (a) and 942.
128. Section 341 tries to prevent personal service income and gain on the sale of
inventory from being taxed at capital gains rates.
129. Section 306 tries to prevent a bail-out of earnings at capital gains rates.
130. § 303.
131. §§ 951-64.
132. The alternative of delegating the decision on tax deductibility to another
agency is beginning to find favor. The deductibility of expenses violating public policy
has occasionally been delegated to a certifying executive agency; see, e.g., I.T. 4105,
1952-2 Cum. BurL. 83, and Weather-Seal Mfg. Co. v. Commissioners, 16 T.C. 312
(1951). The Tax Reform Bill appears to be moving toward this approach. It provides
for the loss of a deduction for bribes, kickbacks and two-thirds of the damages in anti-
trust cases where there was a conviction or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in con-
nection with the activity. § 162(c) & (g), as amended by, TAX RFFORM AcT, § 902(a)
& (b). It is unclear, however, whether these provisions are exclusive or merely guaran-
tee loss of a deduction in the situation described.
The Tax Reform Act has also delegated authority to grant "tax subsidies" in sev-
eral cases: § 169(d) (certified pollution control facility) added by, TAX REFORM ACT, §
704(a); § 514(c) (6) (acquisition indebtedness insured by Federal Housing Adminis-
tration), added by, TAX REFORM AcT, § 121(d) ; §§ 1039 and 1250(a) (1) (c) (ii) (roll-
over exemption and limited recapture on sale of housing projects insured under certain
provisions of National Housing Act), added by, TAX REFoRM AcT, § 910; § 187 (certi-
fied coal mine safety equipment), added by, TAX REFORm AcT, § 707. But see § 167(k)
(3), added by, TAX REFORMAt AcT, § 521 (a) where HUD policies are apparently to be ad-
ministered by the Treasury.
See also a proposal to use the tax law to encourage foreign investment which con-
templated that AID, not the Treasury, would determine eligible projects. Hellawell,
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Of course, the loophole-closing function and the subsidy-excise
function are often mixed. The new rules on industrial revenue bonds were
motivated both by an attempt to eleminate an unintended tax benefit
and to preserve incentives for certain activities.'
Third, detail may also result from a simple desire for certainty.
In part, this objective is related to the subsidy function since fuzzy areas
may tend to inhibit desirable activity. However, the quest for certainty
also has the broader goal of easing the task of compliance for taxpayer
and tax counselor. In this regard, the objective of certainty is potentially
inconsistent with the goal of closing loopholes since the presence of
grey areas can discourage the brinkmanship which leads to unintended
benefits.
Despite their alleged advantages, detailed provisions present a number
of serious problems which counsel against their use. First, the possibility
that they will obscure special legislation has already been noted. Second,
certainty is rarely obtained. For example, the following questions have
been left unresolved by detailed provisions: (1) Will the existence of
more than fifty per cent continuity of interest in an acquiring corporation
result in dividend treatment to some shareholders of the acquired com-
pany?" 4 (2) When is debt subordinated to the "payment of any sub-
stantial amount" of unsecured debt ?... (3) Do the new rules on original
issue discount require finding such discount if the issuing corporation
redeems its own stock which is traded on an exchange ?16 Furthermore,
even if the detail avoids the ambiguities it pretends to eliminate, it surely
fails to accomplish the objective of enabling a general practitioner to
counsel clients on tax problems. Ironically, Congress has recognized its
inability to achieve certainty in the most detailed of statutory provisions
United States Income Taxation and Less Developed Countries: A Critical Appraisal, 66
COLum. L. REv. 1393, 1424-26 (1966).
133. § 103(c).
134. Compare Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 137 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967) (less than 50 per cent new persons sufficient continu-
ity for reorganization) with Gallagher v. Commissioner 39 T.C. 144 (1962) and Lemmet
v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. No. 41 (1970). It is possible that the old much-maligned case
of Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242 (1924) will be revived. It is the only one of the cases
pre-dating the statutory exemption for mergers which did not tax the sellers on the equity
received; it is also the only case in which the only change, other than the formation of a
new corporation in the same state, was 50 per cent of the equity ownership. Cf. Casco
Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 32 (1967) (new corporation treated the same
as the old corporation despite nine per cent redemption without regard to reorganization
provisions; Iherefore, net operating loss carryback allowed).
135. § 279(b) (2) (B), added by, TAx REFORm AcT, § 411(a).
136. See Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co. v. United States, 70-1 U.S.T.C. ff 9245 at 82,780
(Ct. Cl. Feb. 20, 1970). The case held, in effect, that if stock was previously issued for
100 dollars, a redemption for 100 dollars of debt when the stock is worth 90 dollars does
not result in original issue discount.
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by simply giving up and explicitly delegating large portions of rule-
making power to the Treasury.'
Third, confusion bred by the detail leads everyone astray. Congress
makes irrational mistakes, such as the failure to apply the collapsible
corporation rules to short-term capital gains... and the application of
section 303 to stock not available to pay death taxes." 9 Furthermore, the
detail feeds upon itself by encouraging more detail to resolve the errors
of earlier statutes. 40
Courts lack guidance thereby depriving the law of an important
source of internal growth.'4 ' When general language backs up detailed
provisions intended to close a loophole, it is difficult to discern the purpose
of the statute in the light of which the general provisions are to be
judicially interpreted. What, for example, is a "device" under section
355 ?1 Perhaps because of the statute's complexity, the term has some-
times been endowed with a life of its own apart from the statute's under-
lying purpose.'4 3 The lack of apparent statutory purpose also encourages
courts to adopt literal approaches to statutory interpretation. Thus, the
capital gains provisions of section 351 have prevailed over rules in
section 304 designed to identify dividends." As a result capital gains
137. Numerous provisions dealing with income on foreign investments require
Treasury elaboration on substantive not procedural issues; see, e.g., §§ 954(d) (2),
955(b)(3), 960(a)(1), 961(b), 962(a), 963(a), 963(e)(1), 963()(4)(C), 963(f),
964(a), 970(a) (1), 1246(a) (2), 1246(c), 1248(a), 1248(c), 1248(e).
138. Section 341 (a) is inapplicable if the gain is short-term even though a capital
loss will offset such gain but would not offset the personal service income or the gain
on inventory which § 341 is intended to reach (§ 1211(b)).
139. Section 303 (a) applies if the redeemed stock is included in the taxable estate
even though a relative of the decedent might own the stock and the stock would not have
been available to pay the taxes.
140. Cary, Reflections upon the American Law Institute Tax Project and the In-
ternal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and Reappraisal, 60 COLUm. L. Rxv. 259,
278 (1960).
141. The classic statement of befuddlement is Learned Hand's grievance that the
income tax provisions "dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-refer-
ence upon cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched in abstract terms that of-
fer no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some vitally
important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which
is within my power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time." Hand,
Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE I.J. 167, 169 (1947).
142. § 355(a) (1) (B).
143. In Estate of Parshelsky v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1962), on re-
wand, 22 T.C.M. 911 (1963), the taxpayer successfully persuaded the court not to tax a
spin-off by urging the relevance of his purpose to provide a separate asset in a separate
corporation for a charity. No attention was given to whether the purpose had probative
value in indicating the likelihood of a continuation of the investment, which is a major
reason for § 355 and which the "device" rule, if it is to be relevant at all, should imple-
ment.
144. Commissioner v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968). See also, Kelly v.
Commissioner, 293 F.2d 904, 911-12 (5th Cir. 1961) in which the court placed consider-
able reliance on the Code's use of the indefinite article "a" in reaching a decision which
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rates were applied because the investors had eighty per cent continuity of
interest, rather than a fifty per cent to seventy-nine per cent continuity of
interest in the acquiring corporation.
An oversimplified response would attribute the problem to bad
draftsmanship. The easy rejoinder is that there is considerable evidence
that such draftsmanship is inherent in the process of tax legislation. So
many drafters try their hand at the final product that a first draft
syndrome may be encouraged in which no one feels responsible for the
final result. 45 And, of course, there is always the tendency to downgrade
the drafting process. Furthermore, there is a legislative rush about tax
law which discourages craftsmanship. 4 '
More significantly, the quest for certainty disregards the elusiveness
of the goal in the context of a complex economy and an inventive tax
bar. Congress seems to recognize this elusiveness when it creates general
provisions to give the taxpayer escape hatches from detailed restric-
tions,""7 and to give the government a final opportunity to impose a tax,
even if the taxpayer successfully negotiates the labyrinth. 4 '
Unfortunately the habit of detail has become engrained in the law-
making process. There seems to be complete disregard of the doubtful
attainability of certainty and the effect of detail in obscuring purpose.
This lament is not a new one. 49 Sometimes it is followed by disclaiming
a desire for "Hellenic simplicity."' 50 However, while Hellenic simplicity
in the tax law is not attainable, statutory simplification is not an ephe-
meral goal. The desirability of a shift away from statutory elaboration
made avoidance of the collapsible corporation provisions easier than it otherwise would
be; and Newman Co. v. United States, 70-1 U.S. TAX CAS. 9262 at 83,025 (2d Cir. 1970),
in which the court refused to tax a nonresident corporation on the fair market value of
a dividend under § 881 and instead taxed only the adjusted basis pursuant to § 301(b)
(1) (B). Compare the contrary approach in Goldstein v. United States, 364 F.2d 734
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967) which held that "interest" in § 163
did not include interest incurred in a venture with practically no hope of economic profit
other than the gain resulting from the tax law; and Commissioner v. Wodehouse, 337
U.S. 369, 391-92 (1949), in which royalty income was given an expansive definition
when received by nonresident aliens.
145. See Woodworth, Procedures Followed by Congress in Enacting Tax Legisla-
tion and the Role of the Joint Committee Staff in that Process, 18 S. CAL. TAX INST. 21
(1966).
146. See Cary note 140, supra at 270. Very little seems to have changed. Public
hearings on the Tax Reform Act were held during the first half of 1969, but no bill was
examined by the House Ways and Means Committee until July 28; H.R. 91-413 (Part
I), 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (separate views of congressman Gibbons). The bill was
published August 2 (Senate Hearings, at 4156). It passed the House on August 8.
147. See, e.g., § 306(b) (4).
148. See, e.g., § 355(a) (1) (B).
149. Cary, supra note 140 at 277-79; Brown, The Growing Common Law of Taxa-
tion, 34 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 235, 251 (1961).
150. Cary, supra note 140 at 260.
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to the greater use of Treasury regulations in the rule-making process
will be explored in part IV. First, however, some developments of the tax
law affecting conglomerate acquisitions, which primarily involve admin-
istrative rule-making, will be examined.
III. SWEETENERS
Two types of sweeteners are often used in conglomerate acquisitions,
both of which hold out the promise of a greater amount of common
equity than is received in the initial transaction. The option to obtain more
common equity, which may take the form of either a conversion privilege
or separately salable warrants, will be considered first.1"' The discussion
deals with the effect of an option on tax-exempt mergers, tax-deferred,
sales, the existence of original issue discount and with taxability when
the option is exercised. A second type of sweetener to which we then turn
is the contingent right to increased future equity, other than at the
seller's option, such as the contingent right to more stock if the target's
profits develop favorably.'52 The effect of such contingent equity on tax
exempt mergers will be discussed.
In several instances, current law in this area is in a state of pre-
statutory development analogous to the law of exempt mergers prior to
1934. The analysis, therefore, provides an opportunity to study how the
courts and the administration could develop the law rationally without
legislative intervention.
A. OPTIONS
1. Convertibility
a. Effect on Tax-exempt Merger
In a close case the convertibility of debt or preferred stock may
increase the possibility of satisfying continuity requirements since it
creates a dependence on future income which might not be carried by the
security to which it is attached. The investment, however, is not treated
as the equivalent of the stock into which it can be converted. 5 On the
other hand the conversion feature is not treated as separate consideration,
and convertible voting preferred will qualify as voting stock. 4
151. In some cases the option may be to acquire a predetermined increasing amount
of common equity; see, e.g., Litton-Landis, 1 P-H CAP. ADJUSTMENTS 1988-89.
152. See, e.g., U.S. Industries' acquisitions of Jane Colby in 1968 (1 P-H CAP. AD-
JUSTMENTS 1786) and of Capital Wire in 1968 (1 P-H CAP. ADJUSTMENTS 1697).
153. Cf. Neville Coke & Chemical Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 599 (3d Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 726 (1945) (short-term securities convertible into stock not
the equivalent of stock). See also Rev. Rul. 65, 1854-1 CuM. BULL. 101, 103.
154. But see Rev. Rul. 70-108, I.R.B. 1970-10, 12 in which a nontransferrable right,
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b. Effect on Installment Method
The first question is whether the value of the conversion
privilege is a down payment in the year of sale. 5  Selling-tax-
payers will often argue that it is a down payment since it would provide
the needed second payment if the sale is to be eligible for the installment
method.5 6 It is generally believed, however, that the conversion privilege
will not be treated as a separate payment although the Treasury has
yet to rule on the subject." 7 If the conversion privilege is not a separate
payment, there would be no tax on its value if the convertible debt is
eligible for the installment method because other property satisfies the
second payment requirement.
The issue can only be resolved by considering the kind of trans-
actions meant to be covered by the installment sales provisions. The
rationale for disregarding the conversion privilege would be that the
installment sale provisons should disregard property not transferable
separately from the debt which was assumed to be lacking readily
ascertainable value. If this approach were rigidly applied, however, debt
would be eligible for tax deferral under the installment method even if a
major element of value were the conversion feature. Perhaps the best
way to resolve the issue is to disregard the conversion feature if it is not
a substantial part of the total package. It would be strange to lose deferral
when the certainty of realizing gain decreases because part of the sales
price depends upon the future success of the business to a greater extent
than does the debt obligation. It is true that this irrationality is inherent
in the installment sales provisions which were not intended to allow
deferral of tax on equity. Still, where the equity interest is not substantial
and the Code can bear the interpretation, it would be appropriate to
disregard the conversion privilege.
A second problem arises from an unpublished position of the Service
attached to voting convertible preferred, to buy additional common stock for cash at
the time of conversion was held to be property ogier than voting stock.
Another issue arising out of the convertibility of preferred stock is the rele-
vance of convertibility for the stock's status as § 306 stock. Section 305(b) (5)
(as amended by the Tax Reform Act § 421) authorizes the taxation of convertible pre-
ferred as a dividend if it is likely to be used to give some shareholders cash while other
shareholders enjoy an increase in their share of future profits. Although the new pro-
vision is not made expressly applicable to the definition of § 306 stock received as a divi-
dend or in a merger, it is possible that it will influence that definition. See generally
Metzger, The Impact of Section 306 Upon Convertible Preferred Stock Issued in a Cor-
porate Reorganization, 116 U. PA. L. Rav. 755 (1968).
155. The importance of this question is diminished by the rules preventing the use
of the installment method when certain corporate debt is received. See note 78 supra.
156. See note 64 supra.
157. See Appert, supra note 64 at 149.
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that, because the element of convertibility introduces uncertainty into the
value of the consideration received, the installment method cannot be
elected. 5 ' This view apparently finds its origin in the statutory require-
ment that a percentage of total gain realized on the sale must be taxed
when each installment is received, and this percentage cannot be figured
if the sales price is uncertain."5 9 But property can be received in an install-
ment sale which is difficult to value. The real issue is whether the receipt
of such property in an installment sale should be treated differently because
the conversion privilege is not ifself taxed at the time of sale. It seems
that the decision not to tax the conversion privilege at the time of the sale
rests on the analysis of the intent of section 453 outlined above, and there
is nothing in that analysis which suggests violating the normal rule that a
downpayment of property which is difficult to value does not, of itself,
destroy eligibility for the installment method.'
c. Original Issue Discount
Several questions arise concerning the effect of a conversion privilege
on the existence of original issue discount. Even if the new law prevents
the borrower from deducting original issue discount as interest, 6 ' it is
important to determine its existence since it will be taxable at ordinary
rates to the investor and can be the subject of a reporting requirement for
the borrower. 2 The stipulation in the new law that there can be original
issue discount only if either the stock sold or the convertible debt received
is regularly traded on an established securities market is unlikely to present
a problem in conglomerate acquisitions since one of the parties to the
transaction is likely to meet the requirement.
The first problem is whether the value of the convertibility element
can result in original issue discount. For example, if a one hundred dollar
face amount convertible bond were issued for one hundred dollars of stock
and the conversion feature were worth ten dollars, does the investor
receive ten dollars in original issue discount upon the bond's redemption?
158. 30 J. TAXATION 198 (March 1969) (noting that counsel nonetheless advised
that tax deferral was available). See also Massing, Contingent Payments in Taxable Ac-
quisitions, 1969 S. CAs.. TAx INsT. 229, 249-50.
159. § 453(a), (b). The general problem of uncertainty of consideration was at
one time dealt with by allowing the transaction to qualify if the minimum and maximum
amounts were specified, but the Service will no longer rule in such cases; 30 J. TAXATION
288 (May 1969).
160. The tax effect of converting the debt is discussed below; see text accompany-
ing notes 169-79.
161. Since United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965) holds that
the discount serves the "same function as stated interest", the rules on corporate acquisi-
tion indebtedness would apply to the borrower.
162. See note 74 supra.
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The Treasury has not treated the conversion element as giving rise to
original issue discount,'68 a conclusion supportable on the theory that
payment by the corporation on redemption of the debt is, to the extent it
is attributable to the conversion privilege, a payment to repurchase the
option, not interest.
However, even if the value of the conversion feature itself is not
original issue discount, difficult problems still arise in deciding whether
there is original issue discount in certain situations. If the convertible
debt is traded on an exchange, its value will be determinable and the
original issue discount can be easily identified. However, if only the
stock is traded on an exchange, it is not clear whether discount exists
since, in conglomerate acquisitions, premiums are often paid for stock
above listed market value. For example, if stock is traded on an exchange
for ninety dollars and the face value of the convertible debt is one hundred
dollars, is the extra ten dollars original issue discount or a pemium paid
for the stock? To decide, one cannot avoid valuing the debt element by
estimating its worth without the conversion feature to see whether its
value plus that of the conversion element is less than one hundred dollars
unless the new law is interpreted to mean that the value of the stock on
an exchange must be used to detemine if there is original issue dis-
count.'64
If there is original issue discount on the convertible debt, what
happens when the debt is converted into stock, and the corporation has
been deducting the discount pro-rata over the life of the debt? Should
prior deductions be "corrected" on the theory that later conversion elim-
inates the debt? The Service has held in a Revenue Ruling that if
accrued interest was deducted prior to payment by the corporation, the
corporation must correct its prior deduction at the time of conversion to
the extent the prior deduction was of use to it.'65 This approach is in-
consistent with positions taken in analogous areas of the tax law. The fact
that the corporation does not pay the interest in cash should be irrele-
vant; interest can be paid in stock.'6 6 It would seem that when stock is
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b) (2) (i) (1968) ; but see, 30 J. TAXATION 136 (Feb.
1969) and 32 J. TAXATION 102 (Feb. 1970).
164. An interpretation which would maximize original issue discount in that fashion
is out of keeping with earlier attempts to prevent a corporate deduction and investor eva-
sion (see note 68 supra), but is in keeping with the recent shift towards taxing the in-
vestor (see note 74 supra). In Erie Lackawanna R.R. Co. v. United States, supra note
136 at 982-83, n.10, the court assumed without deciding that exchange price quotation
established value, but the government denied that this was necessarily true.
165. Rev. Rul. 58-546, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 143.
166. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(b) (3) (1966) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(e) (3) (Example
2) (1966) involving contingent stock in an otherwise tax-exempt reorganization. See also
§ 305(c) (added by, TAX REFORm AcT § 421) which authorizes the treatment of pre-
484
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issued by the corporation at the time of the conversion it is a payment
of previously deducted interest, and no correction need be made. Perhaps
the correction was required in the past because there was little hope of
taxing the investor, and the correction was a method of capturing taxes
lost at the investor level. If so, there is now less reason to use this
approach since discount must be reported if the debt is registered.'"
d. Taxation upon Conversion
The exercise of a conversion privilege normally is not a taxable event.
Exemption upon conversion pre-dates the statutory exemption for re-
capitalizations."' In theory, the transaction was "open,""' which appears
to be another way of saying that the investment risk remained in the
same assets. The reorganization provisions of 1921, which introduced an
exemption for recapitalizations, 7" might have provided an alternative
basis for exemption. In the conglomerate acquisition context the choice
of theory could make a difference in the taxation of accrued and untaxed
original issue discount or dividend arrears to the seller at the time of con-
version. The result is apparently in doubt. 7' Exclusion by the seller might
be justified as being within the scope of the reorganization provisions,
which include economic incentives among the reasons for their existence;
whereas a more arid "open transaction" analysis would result only in
the exemption of the investment gain and not accrued income.'72 It
would seem that exclusion is inappropriate since the conversion of a
senior security into a junior security would fit within the rationale of the
ferred stock dividends in discharge of dividend arrears as a taxable distribution even
though the transaction is part of an otherwise exempt recapitalization (S. REIP. No. 91-
552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1969)). Contra Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation of Con-
vertible Bonds and Stocks, 74 HARv. L. Rv. 473, 512 (1961) (hereinafter cited as
Fleischer & Gary).
167. See note 74 supra.
168. The history is traced in Fleischer & Cary, supra note 166, at 476-96.
169. Treas. Reg. 45, art. 1563 (1920).
170. Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c) (2), 42 Stat. 230.
171. An unpublished ruling cited in Fleischer & Cary (supra note 166, at 495-96,
n. 104), required accrued interest to be taxed upon conversion to the investor. There is
some authority for not separating out the interest factor in an otherwise exempt merger
but the cases usually involve financially shaky debtors. Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 Cum.
BULL. 76. Commissioner v. Carman, 189 F.2d 363, 364 (2d Cir. 1951). Bu t see Bern-
stein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1364 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 603 (1956) (no indication of
financial difficulty).
The Regulations do not require stock received for dividend arrears to be separately
taxed as a transaction outside of the reorganization exchange (Treas. Reg. § 1.368-
2(e) (5)) (1955) although the Tax Reform Act would authorize a change of this rule
(see note 166 suipra).
172. Other results which follow if only the reorganization approach is adopted in-
clude: (1) The need for a §367 ruling and (2) taxability upon the conversion of a
short-term convertible debt. See Fleischer & Cary, supra note 166, at 491-92.
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recapitalization provisions only if the debtor were stepping down to
equity status in a financially unstable corporation and not converting
his debt to speculate in the equity of a growing company. 3
A second issue involves the treatment of the seller who elected the
installment method when he received convertible debt." 4 Does the normal
rule exempting gain at the time of conversion prevail? The difficulty lies
in the requirement that the creditor be taxed when the obligation is
disposed of and the installment method was elected." 5 Does it follow,
however, that the investment gain inherent in the stock received at the
time of conversion is received for the disposition of the debtor's obliga-
tion, just because the option to obtain stock is exercisable only with the
debt? It would seem that gain in the conversion feature is no more a gain
on the disposition of the obligation than it was an uncertainty in the value
of the debt.' The Code clearly requires only that the value of the obliga-
tion be taxed at the time of disposition. Since the value of the interest
factor can be separated from face value for determining sale proceeds under
the installment method,' it seems equally appropriate to separate the con-
version feature in order to limit the taxation on the disposition of con-
vertible debt to the amount attributable to the obligation. It is true that
the exercise of an option is sometimes taxed, but that result follows only
when there is a major opportunity for tax avoidance, as in the case of
compensatory stock options. Thus, if a compensatory option which does
not qualify for exemption has an uncertain value, it is not taxed when
received, but the price for deferral is a tax at ordinary rates on con-
version." The avoidance of tax at ordinary rates on several elements of
value is thereby prevented; viz., the option which was received at an
earlier date;..9 the increase in value due to personal services to the
corporation whose stock is acquired; and the inside opportunity to buy
the stock. There is no similar tax avoidance potential in the receipt of a
conversion privilege when the installment sales provisions are elected.
173. Another difficulty with a recapitalization theory is that subsequent conversions
might not be viewed as part of a plan of reorganization. See Fleischer & Cary, supra
note 166, at 481-84.
174. We assume now that the installment method was properly elected. See note
158 supra.
175. § 453(d) (1).
176. See text accompanying notes 158-60.
177. See text accompanying notes 69-71.
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.421-6 (1966) (nonstatutory stock options).
179. In the context of restricted stock subject to conditions of forfeiture, § 83(b)
(added by the Tax Reform Act § 321) explicitly gives the taxpayer a choice. He may
recognize the value of the stock at ordinary income rates when the stock is received and
pay capital gains on later appreciation or he may pay ordinary income at a future date
on both the value at the time of receipt and future appreciation when the restrictions are
removed (§ 83(b)).
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Its value is usually small and normally would have been taxed at capital
gains rates anyway has there been no deferral.
2. Warrants
a. Effect on Tax-exempt Merger
Suppose the purchaser issues not convertible stock but instead issues
voting stock and warrants. The Supreme Court has held that warrants
are not voting stock, and so has prevented their use in otherwise exempt
stock-for-stock and asset mergers.18 The Treasury has expanded this
holding to assert that warrants are not equity,' 8' resulting in their
taxation as boot in a statutory merger.'82
Treating warrants as non-voting equity might be supported on the
ground that they are non-voting interests in the corporation for which
the investor must commit additional resources to participate in warrant
profits and that, therefore, they more closely resemble non-voting equity
than a conversion feature attached to voting equity. This analysis would
explain a recent Revenue Ruling which treated as property other than
voting-stock a nontransferrable right attached to convertible voting
preferred to acquire extra voting common for cash.'88 While this con-
clusion seems plausible, its further extension to deny equity status to
warrants is hard to understand.
One theory on which warrants might be denied equity status is that
they, like preferred stock, present a serious bail-out potential because they
are transferable. However, unlike preferred stock, the sale of the warrants
could result- in dilution of the seller's interest if the buyer acquired stock.
Another argument would demur to the point about dilution but assert that
warrants will still be used as a convenient device to give investors a choice
between cash and an increase in equity position. The development of this
practice through the use of convertible preferred stock dividends has been
dealt with in the Tax Reform Act by authorizing regulations to tax the
convertible preferred when its distribution is likely to be used by investors
to get cash in the short-run.8 4 However, in a corporate acquisition the
acceptance of warrants would probably reflect a long term investment
intent, especially if the potential dilution is significant and a significant
cash outlay is required to obtain the stock pursuant to the option. Cer-
180. Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 375 U.S. 194 (1942).
181. Treas. Reg. § 354-1(e) (1955). It is not clear what effect the receipt of war-
rants would have upon the continuity of interest requirement. In a close case, warrants
might tip the scale in favor of exemption for the equity received.
182. See notes 16 supra and 186 infra.
183. Rev. Rul. 70-108, I.R.B. 1970-10, 12.
184. See note 154 supra.
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tainly the adopton of an inflexible position on warrants seems indefensible
and is perhaps attributable to the fact that the detailed provision of
section 306 dealing with preferred stock has obscured the bail-out prob-
lem. Perhaps the relevance of transferability will become apparent and
the simplistic treatment of property other than voting stock as property
other than stock will be re-examined when convertible voting equity, which
is not considered solely voting equity because the taxpayer has a non-
transferable right to acquire more stock for cash at the time of con-
version,"' is used in a statutory merger and the Service claims there is
taxable boot rather than exempt non-voting equity.
Case law is not entirely sympathetic to the Service's point of view.
The court of appeals in dealing with spin-offs in Gordon held that war-
rants were equity in the context of section 355.18' In Bateman the court
argued that the warrants did not have the effect of a dividend. The court
felt that the logic of this conclusion should lead to treating the warrants as
exempt equity, but the restraints of precedent prevented exemption, and
the gain attributable to the value of the warrants was taxed as capital
gain.
b. Effect on Installment Method
The problems presented by a conversion feature when electing the
installment method are avoided if warrants are received. They are
separately saleable and are, therefore, a second payment. As separate
property, they are not thought to introduce an impermissible element of
uncertainty into the proceeds even if they are hard to value. Warrants,
therefore, have been desirable separate payments when the installment
method is sought while convertibility is preferable when the exemption
for a merger must be preserved.
c. Original Issue Discount
The only added dimension to the prior discussion of original issue
discount, when warrants are involved, is the method of determining the
amount of discount.' It was noted earlier that when only the stock is
traded on an exchange there was a problem in valuing the debt unless
one assumes that the market value of the debt is equal to the price of the
185. See note 183 supra.
186. Gordon v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 499, 505 (2d Cir. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
187. Bateman v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 408, 414-15 (1963).
188. We assume that if the stock is not traded on an established securities market
both the debt and the warrants have to be so traded if there is to be original issue dis-
count. See note 79 supra.
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stock on the exchange thereby disregarding the possibility of a premium
being paid for the stock.'89 Even that assumption would be of no avail
if both debt and warrants were issued. In such a case, the issue
price for both debt and warrants is the value of the stock when the debt
was first offered to the public; or if the debt is privately placed, the value
of the stock paid by the first buyer.' In order to determine the portion of
issue price allocable to the debt, thereby determining if there is original
issue discount, the issue price must be allocated to the debt. This alloca-
tion is made in the ratio of the debt's value to the value of both the debt
and warrants. Valuing the debt is therefore inescapable if only the stock
is traded on the exchange, even if one could avoid the problem when the
stock is sold for debt without warrants by assuming that the issue price
is the price of the stock traded on the securities market.
The Regulations state that if the debt is not easily valued because it
is privately placed, an arm's length agreement on the value of the debt will
generally be followed as long as that value is based on an interest rate
not more than one per cent greater than the stated interest rate.' 9' How-
ever, these Regulations, which minimize original issue discount, are
out-of-date. They were issued before the new law prevented corporations
from deducting interest under certain circumstances and required sellers
to accrue the discount.9 2 The Regulations will presumably be amended
to take account of this change of legal climate and, in the meantime, the
requirement that the agreement determining original issue discount be
"at arm's length" and that the agreement will "generally be followed"
gives the needed leeway to prevent high bracket investors from minimiz-
ing the discount by agreement.
d. Taxing the Exercise of Warrants
The exercise of warrants is exempt for the same reason the exercise
of a conversion privilege is not taxed: The investment risk remains in the
same assets. The only basis for an exception would arise if the warrants
were exempt upon receipt and the exemption was thought to have a
tax avoidance potential. Even if warrants were exempt equity in a merger,
however, their exercise should not be taxed since the potential for
avoiding ordinary rates, present when compensatory options are used,
is absent.'
189. See text accompanying note 164.
190. § 1232(b) (2) and Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b) (2) (1968).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b) (2) (ii) (b) (1968).
192. See note 74 supra.
193. See text accompanying notes 178-79.
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B. CONTINGENT EQUITY-EFFECT ON TAX EXEMPT MERGER
'What effect does the right to an increasing amount of equity, which
depends upon future events, have on the tax exempt status of a merger?
Several Service pronouncements... assert that, if the contingent right
is transferable and is readily marketable, then the right is taxable boot.
So viewed, the right would destroy the exempt status of a stock-for-stock
or asset merger and would be taxable boot in an otherwise exempt
statutory merger. This view is reminiscent of the position taken on
warrants. The non-equity classification has slightly greater plausibility
in this context, however, since the likelihood of a sale to obtain cash in the
short run is arguably greater in view of the contingency on which the
future receipt of further equity depends. The conditions under which the
Service apparently allows the use of transferable "escrow stock" without
loss of exemption when the buyer wants to condition the consideration
paid on future events,'9 5 supports the suggestion that the bail-out potential
explains the treatment of contingent equity not placed in escrow. Under
an escrow arrangement, a third party holds the stock which is returned to
the buyer if specified events do not occur. The Service argues that escrow
stock is not boot only if the seller can both vote and receive dividends
before the contingencies occur. 9 ' This view makes sense if the logical basis
for taxation of a contingent right to future equity is the likelihood of sale
for cash. If there are voting rights and right to dividends, dilution
of the seller's interest would occur upon sale and the likelihood that the
arrangement would be used to provide a bail-out potential is decreased.
Several other Service pronouncements specify further conditions
which must be met if the stock received pursuant to the contingency is to
be treated as part of the reorganization, but they are unclear whether fail-
ure to meet these requirements will result in taxing the right to the stock
as boot or only in taxing the stock received at a later date as a dividend. 9
One such condition is that the stock must be payable within five years.
194. Rev. Rul. 66-112, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 68; Rev. Rul. 67-90, 1967-1 Cum. BULL.
79.
195. Tillinghast, Contingent Stock Pay-Outs in Tax-Free Reorganizations, 22
TAX LAWYER 467, 478 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Tillinghast). Murphy, Contingent
Share Reorganizations, 1969 So. CAL. TAX. INST. 255, 280-81 (hereinafter cited as
Murphy). An example of a conglomerate acquisition using an escrow stock arrangement
is Whittaker-Fanon, 1 P-H CAP. ADJUSTMENTS 1961.
196. Tillinghast, supra note 195 at 483 and 485. In Rev. Rul. 70-120, I.R.B. 1970-11,
15, the Service held that the imputed interest rules of § 483 did not apply to an exempt
statutory merger in which non-transferable escrow stock was received, and the seller had
dividend and voting rights. There is no suggestion, however, that non-transferability is
a condition for exemption of the merger.
197. Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 Cumt. BULL. 1232; Rev. Proc. 67-13, 1967-1 Cum.
BULL. 590.
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If failure to meet this requirement resulted in taxation of the contingent
right as boot, the result would be irrational. If no bail-out problem exists,
there is no reason to tax the right. The five year rule would, however,
be reasonable if used to distinguish proceeds of a sale from stock dividends.
Indeed, the new 1969 Regulations, which tax stock dividends payable
"in all events"' 98 on one of several classes of stock, do not apply if the
stock is received as an adjustment of consideration within five years of a
sale. 99 The issue which then arises is whether these Regulations supersede
the Revenue Procedures applicable to contingent stock in light of the
reference to "in all events." This phrase was probably intended to dis-
tinguish the case where the distributing corporation had discretion, not
where objective conditions, such as future profits, determined the payment.
Therefore, contingent stock payable over more than five years should
be taxed under the new Regulations; contingent stock received over five
years or less in connection with an exempt reorganization would be taxed
only to the extent required by the imputed interest rules.2"' In neither case
should a non-marketable right to contingent equity affect the exempt status
of the earlier transaction in which the right was received. The validity of
this analysis is supported by the fact that escrow stock which does not
present the bail-out potential can apparently be used without destroying
the exemption whether or not the contingency must be resolved within
five years of the original transaction.20'
The Revenue Procedures also state that the contingent equity must
be no more than fifty per cent of the total consideration. It has been sug-
gested that this requirement was designed to insure a significant continuity
of interest even if the contingency fails to materialize.0 2 However, the
absence of a requirement of significant continuity in the equity of the
acquirer makes this explanation implausible. A more reasonable explana-
tion of the fifty percent requirement is that the danger of disguised com-
pensatory stock payments is increased if the contingent stock is a very
large percentage of the consideration.02 Under this view, the rule is illogi-
cal if used to destroy the exemption upon a sale of stock since a taxable
salary paid in stock for future services is no more received in exchange
for stock than future imputed interest payments, the taxation of which
198. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(b) (1) (1969). It is not clear whether § 305(c) (added
by TAx REFoRm AcT, § 421 (a)) authorizes Regulations to deal with stock dividends pay-
able in all events or only those stock dividends where the shareholder's choice of prop-
erty or stock is inferable.
199. Treas. Reg. § 1.305-3(b) (4) (1969).
200. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1(e) (3) (Example 2) (1966).
201. Murphy, supra note 195 at 281; Tillinghast, supra note 195 at 488.
202. Tillinghast, supra note 195 at 210.
203. See Murphy, supra note 195 at 265.
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does not affect the merger. However, the tradition of preventing tax
avoidance on compensation"" might be extended to destroy the exemp-
tion of a merger when the contingent equity presents a risk that com-
pensation will go untaxed. If this rationale were applied, the use of
escrow stock should be equally vulnerable.
IV. TOWARDS REFORMING THE RULE-MAKING
PROCESS
The common thread of criticism which runs though our observations
of the rule-making process is that original premises remained un-
examined. The malaise affects both the lawmaker and interpreter. Con-
gress perpetuates the exemption for mergers and discourages acquisitions
for debt without really knowing why. Rules dealing with the effect of con-
version options on election of the installment method and with the effect
of equity options and contingent equity on exempt mergers are fashioned
as though the statute contained no underlying principles.
Recent consideration of rule-making has focused on the legislative
process and particularly on the use of tax subsidies. However, concern
with this problem has tended to wander off in a search for an ideal tax
base instead of concentrating on the process which produces the per-
ceived evil.2"5 This article, on the other hand, has viewed the problems of
tax legislation and tax subsidies in relation to the rule-making process.
Tax rules are made in various ways and the role played by Congress
cannot be understood or reformed without examing the entire process.
The conclusion suggested by our earlier discussion is that Congress' role
in developing the tax law must be de-emphasized. First, Congress lacks
204. See text accompanying notes 178-79.
205. The earlier debate on tax subsidies focussed on the search for a "comprehen-
sive tax base." Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform,
80 HARv. L. REv. 925 (1967) ; Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 H.av. L.
REv. 44 (1967) ; Galvin, More on Boris Bittker and the Comprehensive Tax Base: The
Practicalities of Tax Reform and the ABA's CSTR, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (1968);
Bittker, Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1032 (1968).
The foregoing are reprinted in B. BITTKER AND OTHERS, A COMPREHENSIVE TAX BASE?
A DE13ATE (Federal Tax Press 1968).
The more recent debate on "tax expenditures" has shifted towards concern with the
legislative process. Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969) ; Surrey and Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Bud-
get-Response to Professor Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 528 (1969) ; Bittker, The Tax Ex-
penditure Budget-A Reply to Professors Surrey and Hellnunth, 22 NAT'I TAx J. 538
(1969) ; Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REv. 705 (1970). The
major point has always been that a law which continually departs from an approach
which has the "widespread loyalty that the Haig-Simons definition commands" deserves
the closest scrutiny (the phrase in quotes is in Professor Bittker's reply to Surrey and
Hellmuth, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 538, 542 (1969)).
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the ability to interpret the open spaces in the tax law. Thus, if the Treasury
had been allowed to develop continuity of interest rules, the statute on
corporate acquisitions might not have emerged in its current, highly
articulated and confused form. Second, coherent development of the
law combined with a presumption against Congressional action would
remove some of the motivation for tax legislation thereby creating an
atmosphere in which Congress could better examine the premises of the
law it is called upon to enact. For example, if the presumption had been
in favor of Treasury resolution of the equity-debt distinction and had the
statute been less cluttered, the attempt to pass hidden special legislation
to protect established companies from takeovers might not have sur-
vived Congressional scrutiny. Indeed, the reform of the legislative process,
which is a primary goal of those opposed to tax subsidies, will probably
have to await a broader reform of the rule-making process now that
public pressure for reform has been defused by the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969.206
The prognosis for improving the rule-making process cannot be
optimistic."'T The Tax Reform Act continues the trend toward detailed
Congressional rules. 0 ' Indeed, the new law successfully uses detail not
206. The failure of the American Bar Foundation to continue financing further tax
reform studies is symptomatic; 22 TAx LAWYER 53 (1968).
207. The Secretary of the Treasury seems to view the problem of statutory com-
plexity as resolvable by removing people from the tax rolls; complexity is all right in
his view if only tax advisors and accountants have to deal With the problem. Remarks of
Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy before the American Petroleum Institute, Houston,
Texas, Nov. 10, 1965 (at 5).
The Subcommittee on Legislative Regulations of the Tax Section of the American
Bar Association provides a ray of hope. It suggested that "the proper direction for tax
legislation is toward more generalized statutes with more emphasis on policy and objec-
tives and less on the rules of detailed application." 21 TAx LAWYER 973 (1968). The
Tax Section changed the recommendation to read: "The proper direction for tax legis-
lation is toward more emphasis on policy and less on detail"; 22 TAx LAWYER 18 (1968).
It is not clear whether the Tax Section was applying its principal of "less detail" in
changing the wording or was disagreeing with its subcommittee.
208. In view of earlier comments on the potential role of judicial and Treasury in-
terpretation in forestalling detailed Congressional "solutions," it is discouraging to note
several areas of "reform" which could have been avoided by courts or the Treasury. For
example, the new law on bootstrap sales (§§ 514 & 1253, added by, TAX REFORm ACT §§
121(d), 516(c)), might have been avoided if transfers to charity for consideration which
depended solely upon the profitability of the transferred property had not been treated as
a sale (Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965)), or the effect of such transfers on
the charity's own tax posture had not been favorable (University Hill Foundation, 51
T.C. 548 (1969)). The entire subject of private foundations might have been avoided
in the new tax law (§§ 507-09 & 4940-48, added by, TAx REFO m AcT § 101) if Learned
Hand's suggestion that exemption for such conduits was not within the statute's purpose
had been listened to thirty years ago (Havemeyer v. Commissioner, 98 F.2d 706, 707-08
(2d Cir. 1938) (dissenting)).
The need for the "excess deductions account" rules (§ 1251, added by, TAx RExORm
AcT § 211 (a)) might not have developed if the Regulations allowing farmers to deduct
expenditures which other taxpayers must add to cost had been modified so that only
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merely to confuse the reader but also to conceal the limited nature of the
reforms. One example of limited change, hidden in a web of detail, is
the minimum ten per cent levy on "tax preference" income."' The tax
base for the minimum tax is reduced by the regular income tax.210 This
reduces the effective minimum tax rate below ten per cent, which reduc-
tion increases as the taxpayer's tax bracket rises.21' Similarly, the new
hobby loss rules not only end up restating the case law, but also create a
presumption for the taxpayer. 12
These remarks should not be confused with a blind faith in the
ability of the Treasury and of the Service, rather than the legislature, to
develop the law rationally. Much of this article is a criticism of results
reached by courts and the administration. Judicial failure is most
apparent in developing continuity of interest rules.212 Part III suggested
that Treasury Regulations have erred in treating warrants as boot214
and that the Service has made a jumble of the taxation of interest paid
in stock212 and of the rules on contingent equity."' Still, the potential for
effective rule-making is greater outside of Congress, and improvements
in rule-making cannot preceed without a move in that direction.
Although hard thought remains a major ingredient in interpreting
any law, there are a number of institutional modifications which could
improve the effectiveness of the judiciary and the administration as
rule-makers. Suggestions for a Court of Tax Appeals have, in part, been
based on a desire to improve the courts' role in developing tax law.2"'
those with genuine bookkeeping difficulty received the benefit (Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12
(1958)) ; United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 110, 115, n.23, 116 (1965).
209. §§ 56-58, added by, TAx REFORMi AcT § 301 (a).
210. § 56(a) (2), added by, TAx REFORM AcT § 301(a).
211. Assume a taxpayer earns one hundred dollars taxed at a sixty per cent effec-
tive tax rate. If he earns another two hundred dollars of exempt tax preference income,
his total tax without the ten per cent minimum tax is sixty dollars. One migtit think that
the new law imposes not only a sixty dollar tax on the first one hundred dollars, but
an additional twenty dollar tax (i.e., ten per cent of two hundred dollars tax preference
income) for a total of eighty dollars. However, the sixty dollar regular tax is sub-
tracted from two hundred dollars and the added tax is only fourteen dollars (ten per cent
of 140 dollars). If the taxpayer's regular effective tax rate is seventy per cent, the mini-
mum tax declines to thirteen dollars. (The example disregards the 30,000 dollar floor
on items of tax preference income subject to the ten per cent tax).
212. § 183, added by, TAx REFORM AcT § 213.
213. See text accompanying notes 9-15 supra.
214. Sufpra note 181.
215. See text accompanying notes 165-66.
216. See Part IIIB of text.
217. Cary, Reflections Upon the American Law Institute Tax Project and the In-
ternal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium and Reappraisal, 60 COLUm. L. REv. 259,
281 (1960) ; Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 34 So. CAL. L. REv. 235,
251 (1961) ; Lowndes, Federal Taxatio;n and the Supreme Court, 1960 Sup. Cr. R v. 222,
223, 257.
For example, the inconsistency in the treatment of the investor's original issue dis-
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However, while such changes would be useful, the major focus of any
shift from an emphasis on legislative rule-making will have to b on
improving the administrative rule-making process.21 The following com-
ments develop the thesis that a reduction in the weight afforded published
rulings and an expansion of the Regulations program give the greatest
hope for such improvement. 19 We first discuss the rulings program and
then turn to Regulations.
Published rulings currently -enjoy a dignity not justified by the.
process by which they are developed. They emerge from the Office of the
Assistant Comissioner (Technical) after review primarily by "technical
specialists" ' who are not usually attorneys. There are uncertain in-
dications that further review takes place in the Interpretative Division
of the Chief Counsel's office, but the evidence indicates that the job is
treated with a lack of urgency.' Treasury review is practically non-
existent before publication.2 There is no public notice or hearing prior
to publishing a ruling. Despite these shortcomings, however, the Service
states that taxpayers "generally may rely" upon published rulings and
that revocation, if it occurs, will "ordinarily" be prospective." The Ser-
vice thereby perpetuates rules which have defects similar to the tax laws
count led to § 1232 of the INTERNAL REVENUE CODE Of 1954. If United States v. Midland-
Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965), had been decided by a Court of Tax Appeals before the
1954 Code, the need for statutory elaboration to resolve doubts might not have developed.
218. An example of a Treasury Regulation which develops rules in an area where
courts are reluctant to act is Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-1 (d) (1959), holding that the capital
asset status of property owned by a Subchapter S corporation is determined by reference
to the activities of "substantial" shareholders and other Subchapter S corporations in
which they are shareholders. In Braunstein v. Commissioner, 374 U.S. 65 (1963), the
Court refused a request to make such inquiries in the collapsible corporation area.
219. See generally Shapiro, The Choice of Ridemaking or Adjudication in the De-
velopment of Administrative Policy, 78 H,v. L. REv. 921 (1965). Our concern is with
the choice between rule-making by regulation, and rule-making by published ruling.
220. This phrase is borrowed from L. WRIGHT, COMPARATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES iN TAXATioN 65 (1968) (hereinafter cited as WRIGHT).
221. This task does not appear explicitly in the description of the Interpretative Di-
vision's functions; Statement of Organization and Functions of the Internal Revenue
Service at § 1113.(10)22, reprinted in, 34 Fed. Reg. 1680 (Feb. 4, 1969). In 1964 re-
view by the Chief Counsel's Office was explicitly limited to "the most important or com-
plex rulings' (I.R.S. News Release, May 21, 1964, 647 CCH 6610). WRIGHT at 52-53,
n.146 says that such review is "usual." Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings,
Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 766 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Rogovi.)
says it is "formal or informal." See also Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal
Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, 20 N.Y.U. TAX INST. 1, 28 (1962) (here-
inafter cited as Caplin).
222. WRIGHT at 31.
223. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(1) (9) & (10) (1969). The general question of binding
the Service to statements by Service employees, whether in the form of published rulings
or, otherwise, is discussed in Lynn and Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion
as Applied Against United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAX L. REv. 487
(1964). See also Magill, Finality of Determinations of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 28 COLUm. L. REv. 563 (1928).
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and which hardly provide a reasonable alternative to Congressional rule-
making.
Confusion is common. Reference has already been made to the rules
on contingent equity and convertible stock, but other examples can be
cited. It took three published rulings to "clear up" the deductibility of
mortgage points, but the law remains uncertain.2 4 No one understands
why the Service ruled that expenses to secure, but not to seek, a job are
deductible.225 And anyone who thinks "home" always means "business
home" should consider the Revenue Ruling dealing with construction
workers."' Published rulings also open up unintended loopholes. In-
dustrial revenue bonds227 and foreign actors22 s have been beneficiaries of
such rulings despite the fact that the statute could easily bear contrary
interpretations. Furthermore, the problem is not merely one of past
mistakes only prospectively corrected. Since a published ruling binds
224. The Service first ruled that interest prepayments might not be deductible when
the deduction would distort income; Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 Cuar. BULL. 76. It then
stated that mortgage points could be deductible. Rev. Rul. 69-188, I.R.B. 1969-16, 8.
Someone must have then realized that mortgage points are prepayments and that a con-
flict with the prior ruling might exist. The Service, therefore, ruled that mortgage
points of 1200 dollars paid on a loan of 20,000 dollars were deductible when incurred. Rev.
Rul. 69-582, I.R.B. 1969-47, 8. However, this last ruling does not explain whether it is
based on the amount of the payments and the loan or whether all prepayments in the
form of mortgage points are deductible. The first ruling listed many criteria for iden-
tifying deductible prepayments, including both the amount and purpose of the payments,
but the last ruling is silent as to its rationale.
225. Rev. Rul. 60-158, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 140; Rev. Rul. 60-223, 1960-1 Cum. BULL.
57. The Service has never explained why expenses of securing employment are not capi-
tal expenditures, if the taxpayer is seeking his first job, nor why expenses to seek the
first job are not deductible losses when the effort fails. The fact that the taxpayer has
not yet begun his income-producing venture should be irrelevant since his purpose is to
make a profit. See Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. No. 36 (1970), which might in-
itiate some rational development of this area.
226. Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 60, 67. Chief Justice Warren seemed to
think that the Commissioner has consistently defined "home." Commissioner v. Stidger,
386 U.S. 287, 290 (1967).
227. Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 28. Surely the obligations of a govern-
ment need not include debts for which the government's credit is not pledged.
228. Rev. Rul. 54-119, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 156 interprets the exemption for indus-
trial and commercial profits of a foreign corporation which is found in many of our in-
come tax treaties (see, e.g., Convention and Protocol Between the United States and
Canada Respecting Double Taxation, March 4, 1942, 56 Stat. 1399, T.S. No. 983) to in-
clude payments for the services of an entertainer without limiting the exemption to cases
where the employee is not an owner of the corporation, although it could have been easily
limited to such cases. The salary to the owner-employee is often exempt if the enter-
tainer limits his stay in the United States. (Id. at art. VII (1) (a)). A personal hold-
ing company tax and a tax on the dividends paid by the corporation are impossible to
collect. Section 482 is available to tax the entertainer (Borge v. C.I.R., 405 F.2d 673 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 933 (1969)), but collection remains a problem. The
United States-Japanese Income Tax Treaty, contains a detailed provision to close the
loophole. Convention witi- Japan Respecting Double Taxation, arts. 11(1) (i) (ii)E,
IX (2), CCH TAX TREATY REP. 1111 4405, 4412 at 4407, 4409-2, -3.
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agents as a matter of internal housekeeping, 2 9 and officials issuing private
rulings are not likely to question a published ruling's validity, admin-
istrative practice builds up easily around a published ruling. The ruling
then serves as weighty evidence of long-standing administrative practice
and makes prospective change more difficult, both legally.. and political-
ly. 3'
Why are published rulings afforded such dignity if they are an
inferior form of rulemaking? We will first look at the court's approach to
these Service pronouncements in the cases dealing with equal treatment
of taxpayers and with protection of a reliance interest to see whether they
require or encourage this result. After inquiring into judicial attitudes
we will comment on factors perceived by the Service which might explain
its views. Our discussion of published rulings will then conclude with
some suggestions for reducing their stature.
Equal treatment of taxpayers is a problem whenever a published
ruling is retroactively revoked since revocation routinely involves some
inequity. Numerous taxpayers will be treated differently from certain
categories of taxpayers who will automatically be granted an exception
from the effect of revocation, such as those who received and relied on
private rulings," 2 those whose cases were closed after audit. 3 and those for
whom the statute of limitations has run.2"' Furthermore, even a prospec-
229. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a) (1) & (1)(9) & (10) (1969).
230. See, e.g., Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 279 (1966)
in which the Service's earlier interpretation in published Rulings became imbedded in the
statute. Administrative interpretation based on the difficulty of administering a contrary
rule might stand on firmer ground than interpretations based on other factors; see, e.g.,
United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
231. In 1969, the Treasury tried to revoke Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 28
and some of its progeny dealing with industrial revenue bonds (see Proposed Treas. Reg.
§ 1.103-7, 33 Fed. Reg. 4950 (March 23, 1968)). The effort met with vigorous opposi-
tion. A statute finally revoked some of the benefits, but only in a complex fashion which
preserved exemption in numerous situations in which communities had grown to depend
upon the economic activity approved by the published ruling; § 103(c), added by, Pub. L.
No. 90-364, § 107(a).
232. The Service's announced policy as to private rulings issued directly to a tax-
payer (sometimes referred to as "letter rulings") is to revoke them prospectively except
in "rare or unusual circumstances" if the taxpayer relies upon the ruling when engaging
in a transaction. Treas. Reg. § 601.201 (1) (5) (1969).
233. The Service states that it does not open cases closed after audit to a tax-
payer's detriment unless there is evidence of fraud, malfeasance, collusion, concealment
or misrepresentation of a material fact, a clearly defined substantial error based on an
established Service position existing at the time of the previous examination or if other
circumstances exist which indicate that failure to reopen would be a serious administrative
omission. Treas. Reg. § 601.105 (j) (1) (1969) ; furthermore, cases closed by mutual con-
cessions will only be reopened for fraud, malfeasance, concealment or misrepresentation of
material fact, or an important mistake in mathematical calculation; Treas. Reg. §
601.106(h) (1) (1969).
234. §§ 6501 and 6503.
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tively revoked ruling discriminates against those who failed to enter a
transaction prior to the date of revocation.
ThIe concern of courts with equal treatment has recently been placed
in sharp focus by the IBM case,2"5 which both illuminates the limita-
tions on using considerations of equal treatment in federal tax cases and
suggests that such considerations should normally place no obstacle in
the way of revoking published rulings. In IBM the taxpayer success-
fully complained that its major competitor received a ruling whereas it
was denied a ruling on the same facts after a long delay. The IBM
case properly approaches equal treatment as part of the larger question
of whether the agency has abused its discretion." 6 The search, therefore,
is not merely for inequity, but for inequity which results from improper
administrative behavior. When approached in that manner, the appropriate
tasks are to identify the burden of the inequity on the aggrieved party and
the manner of administrative behavior leading to that result. With regard
to the burden on the taxpayer, the IBM case deals with the very special
problem of unequal treatment of the only two large competitors in a
market.3 7 When published rulings are revoked, such inequity will rarely
be presented. Furthermore, the equal treatment of taxpayers who are in
similar legal positions without regard to the accuracy of the result raises
legitimate objections from the much larger group of taxpayers who must
pay the correct tax.2"'
If we look at the behavior of the administration in the IBM case,
235. International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl.
1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 920 (1964).
236. Id. at 920. See also Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 80 (1964). The
statutory base for inquiring about an abuse of discretion is said to be § 7805(b) which
authorizes prospective revocation of rulings. However, this section was intended to ex-
pand the Treasury's power which was at one time thought analogous to a court's power
to interpret the law only with retroactive effect (WRIGHT at 17). It would be better to
recognize that behavior found to be an abuse of discretion generally falls outside an of-
ficial's statutory authority in the absence of explicit provisions to the contrary.
237. The element of discrimination among major economic competitors might ex-
plain IBM, without regard to the further element of administrative abuse. Bookwalter v.
Brecklein, 357 F.2d 78, 83 (8th Cir. 1966) ; Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558,
564 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ; Shakespeare v. United States, 389 F.2d 772, 777 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
See also City Loan and Savings Co. v- United States, 177 F. Supp. 843 (N.D. Ohio
1959), a!f'd on other grounds, 287 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1961) in which discrimination be-
tween the only two competitors was not allowed after the Commissioner had published
his acquiescence in a case involving one competitor.
238. While we have not been accustomed to comparing all taxpayers to each other,
the publicity given to "tax subsidies" (see note 205 supra) may develop in the public a
belief that one man's tax reduction means that another taxpayer must make up the dif-
ference. Cf. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 599, 602-03 (1948), in which the
government was able to reopen an issue previously decided after litigation despite a claim
of collateral estoppel, in part because a contrary result would accord the taxpayer "a tax
treatment different from that given to other taxpayers of the same class."
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we find that the branch in the national office which issued rulings
knowingly discriminated against IBM by rejecting its request for a ruling
and delayed for some time before responding to the request. 39 We do not
suggest that "conscious discrimination""24 and delay will, of themselves,
always constitute an abuse of discretion by an agency. The important
point is that by citing these factors the court properly sought to determine
whether the administration acted arbitrarily and not merely to identify
unequal treatment.
In the context of published rulings, therefore, the question is
whether the unequal treatment resulting from the routine exemptions to
their revocation described above is the product of impermissible admin-
istrative behavior. In our view, the reasons for the routine exemptions are
all based on criteria which administrations can legitimately consider.
First, the exceptions for cases closed on audit and barred by the
statute of limitations are the natural result of a decentralized enforcement
process. The volume and geographical diversity of work require selectivity
in the audit process and make uniformity of decision-making impossible.
When the Service accepts the consequences of this process by treating the
results as final upon revoking a published ruling and refuses to extend
those benefits to those who have not been favored by the decentralized
decision-making process, it is not acting arbitrarily.241 If the Service's
actions were considered as an abuse of discretion when it applied a rea-
sonable rule of finality,242 all diverse decisions would be objectionable. A
decision on audit in the New York office or in a private ruling from the
239. 343 F.2d at 916-17.
240. The phrase appears in Wagner v. United States, 387 F.2d 966, 972 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
241. If non-uniformity is the result of failing to use reasonable techniques to elimi-
nate it, administrative disregard of the problem might be as impermissible as "conscious
discrimination." Recent cases in which unequal property tax valuations have been found
impermissible are examples: In re Appeal of Kents, 34 N.J. 21, 28-30, 166 A.2d 763,
767-68 (1961) ; Hamn v. Minnesota, 255 Minn. 64, 70-71, 95 N.W.2d 649, 654-55 (1959) ;
In re Brooks Building, 391 Pa. 94, 98-102, 137 A.2d 273, 275-76 (1958). However, the
Service already does a very defensible job of review and post-review to try to prevent
whimsical decision-making from becoming institutionalized.
The needs of administration emerged as an excuse for unequal treatment in Book-
waiter v. Brecklein, 357 F.2d 78, 83 (8th Cir. 1966), where the prospective revocation of
a private ruling was justified on administrative grounds against a claim of inequity by a
similarly situated taxpayer who did not receive a ruling. Cf. Barr v. C.I.R., 51 T.C. 693
(1969) (disallowance of a deduction for personal exemptions for non-citizen dependents
was justified because of the difficulty of administrative verification).
242. There is even a hint in some cases that a case closed on audit, not only cases
on which the statute of limitations has run, must remain closed; see, e.g., Guggenhein v.
United States, 77 F. Supp. 186 (Ct. Cl. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 908, rehearing denied,
336 U.S. 911 (1949) (predecessor of Form 870-AD binding) ; Vestal v. C.I.R., 152 F.2d
132 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (Service not allowed to adopt a litigating position inconsistent with
earlier position on same transaction).
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national office would have to be applied to a California resident on audit.
We do not expect such uniformity from our court system and it is hard
to see why we should require it from the Internal Revenue Service. Such
a requirement would be false to the emphasis in the IBM case on the
taxpayer's application for a ruling, which established that its different
treatment resulted not merely from a decentralized audit process but from
a conscious distinction made by one office which was capable of reviewing
its official decisions to prevent unreasoned variation. 43
A second routine exception from the effect of a revoked published
ruling is made for the recipient of an earlier private ruling. However, the
decision by the agency to defer to a taxpayer's reliance interest by honor-
ing its promise not to revoke a private ruling except in rare and unusual
circumstances,244 despite its decision to revoke a published ruling which
does not carry such a promise, cannot be labeled arbitrary. Indeed, we
will soon examine some cases which suggest that reneging on such a
promise is itself some evidence of arbitrary action.24
Finally, revocation of a published ruling either prospectively or
retroactively is usually the result of a developing view of the law. As long
as the change is explained as a consequence of that process, those affected
by the resulting change uniformly applied, except as to taxpayers bene-
fitting from administrative considerations of finality and reliance, cannot
legitimately complain of arbitrary agency action.246
A second line of cases which has obvious relevance for the stature
of published rulings deals with holding the Service to its statement of the
law. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that these cases are a
mechanical protection of a reliance interest any more than the IBM
243. Several cases after IBM found the failure to apply for a ruling a basis for
distinction; Bornstein v. United States, 345 F.2d 558, 564 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ; Van Norman
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 361 F.2d 992, 999 (Ct. Cl. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
981 (1967) ; Shakespeare v. United States, 389 F.2d 772, 777 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
In Bookwalter v. Brecklein, 357 F.2d at 82 and 84, the court emphasized the fact
that no ruling had been applied for, although it failed to emphasize that the same district
office to which the taxpayer had addressed his request for a refund prior to the Service's
change of position had issued a favorable determination letter to another similarly situ-
ated taxpayer. Id. at 80-81.....
But see Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932, 940-41 (Ct. Cl. 1965), in which the
court seemed willing to consider a claim of unequal treatment among taxpayers who had
not received a private ruling.
244. See note 232 supra.
245. See text accompanying notes 247-48 infra.
246. On the other hand, the retroactive application of a new interpretation only as
to those who have not paid their taxes is impermissible; Connecticut Ry. and Lighting
Co. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 907 (Ct. Cl. 1956) ; Exchange Parts Co., Inc. v. United
States, 279 F.2d 251 (Ct. C1. 1960). This requirement that substantive agency rule-
making make rational distinctions is most comprehensively developed in Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion in Kaiser v. United States, 363 U.S. 299, 305-25 (1960).
See also United States v. Catto, 384 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1966).
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case is a simple application of equal treatment considerations. The
question, as before, is whether the Service has abused its discretion. The
American Plywood24 case illustrated this point clearly. The taxpayer
was an exempt business league which arguably had engaged in some
activities which went beyond the purposes for which it received exempt
status. The Service decided that these activities were not "incidental"
and retroactively revoked the private ruling granting exemption. The
court, in an alternative holding which was later deleted from the officially
reported opinion, refused to rely on estoppel to bar the government's
action, but found retroactive revocation without notice an abuse of
discretion. In finding abuse, the court emphasized that the Service's own
internal rules forbade retroactive revocation of a private ruling except in
rare or unusual circumstances. Apparently, the reliance interest in private
rulings and in the Service's published revocation policy does not deserve
protection by itself, but a departure from internal agency standards where
a reliance interest exists might be an abuse of discretion. In taking this
approach, the court aligned itself with a developing body of cases which
refuse to permit a departure from agency rules where the potential loss
to the aggrieved party is great and departure from the agency rule
presents a serious risk of arbitrariness. 48
There are several other elements in American Plywood which ac-
centuate both the significance of the loss and the risk of arbitrariness
resulting from the Service's interference with a reliance interest. First, the
court emphasized the special place of exempt organizations in our society
and the contributions of the taxpayer to the public good.24 Second, the
247. American Plywood Association v. United States, 67-1 U.S. TAX CAs. 1 9245 at
83,528, revised opinion published, 267 F. Supp. 830 (W.D.D.C. 1967).
248. The following cases, which all involve rules embodying an agency's own ver-
sion of a fair hearing, are illustrative:
Immigration: United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954)
(Board of Immigration improperly failed to follow its own procedures calling for it to
exercise discretion after a hearing).
Government employment: Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540 (1959) (must obey
internally adopted rules of evidence in security hearings).
Military Law: Smith v. Resor, 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969) (order to reservist to
report for active duty improper when Army did not follow its procedures for review of
company commander's order).
Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (revoking security clearance resulting
in loss of job is beyond agency's authority if no opportunity to cross-examine).
See also Heffner v. United States, 70-1 U.S. TAX CAs. 9152 at 82,657 (4th Cir.
1969), in which the court (held the I.R.S. bound to give the Miranda-type warn-
ings required by its own rules. The court did not care that the public notice and hearing
procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act had not been followed in adopting the
rules or that the warnings might not be constitutionally required.
249. 67-1 U.S. TAX CAs. 1 9245 at 83, 528. In Lesavoy Foundation v. Commis-
sioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956) the special place of exempt organizations in the tax
lav emerged clearly. Despite an admitted confusion in the law involving the relevance
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court noted the "judgmental" quality of the decision which was reversed;
i.e., whether activities were "incidental" thereby suggesting the capricious-
ness of the Service's action. Several other cases which have held the
Service bound by its private rulings have also involved reversals of
judgment about the application of legal standards to facts.25 Of course,
such reversals need not be capricious... if the reversal is based on a
changed view of the legal standards to be applied. However, since the
injection of additional standards or the re-alignment of the weight of the
standards used in making a judgment shades imperceptibly into a reversal
of judgment,252 the absence of an explanation by the agency indicating
that its decision is more than simply a reversal of judgment can legiti-
mately be considered evidence of capriciousness. An explanation would
also make clear that the changed view is one which could have been
anticipated and, therefore, protected against by competent legal counsel.
If the taxpayer's "reliance interest" is analyzed in the above fashion,
there is little opportunity to find an abuse of discretion upon revocation
of published rulings. First, the internal agency rule on revocation of pub-
lished rulings allows more discretion than in the case of private rul-
of the use of an exempt foundation to help a founder's business, retroactive revocation
was not allowed. The Service's own special concern for exempt organizations is re-
flected in the especially detailed rules to be followed if an exempt organization's private
ruling is to be revoked or modified. Rev. Proc. 69-3, I.R.B. 1969-1, 16; Rev. Proc. 69-4,
I.R.B. 1969-1, 19. Congress has required that revocation be prospective in certain cir-
cumstances since 1960; § 503(a) (2), amended by, Pub. L. No. 86-67, § 2(g) (2) (1960).
Another possible category of special concern is the fiduciary who distributes prop-
erty in reliance on the Service's advice. In Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311, 317-
18 (9th Cir. 1962) a bank successfully defended against a change in a legal position pre-
viously embodied in the lowly form of an agent's statement because the property was
never the bank's to enjoy and the bank could not have defended against the beneficiary's
demand for the property. Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. at 77, n.9 cites but does not
explicitly disapprove of Schuster. Cf. Adler v. Nicholas, 166 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1948),
allowing an injunction against collection of tax from the wrong taxpayer despite the
prohibition of § 7421.
250. Woodworth v. Kales, 26 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1928) (value of stock) ; H.S.D.
Co. v. Kavanaugh, 191 F.2d 831, 845-46 (6th Cir. 1951) (was an employee's trust non-
discriminatory and for the exclusive benefit of employees?). The Supreme Court in
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 184 (1957), characterized
these cases as not involving "mistakes of law," thereby suggesting that mistakes of fact
cannot be retroactively corrected.
251. Cf. Dixie Furniture Company v. C.I.R., 390 F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1968), in which
Judge Blackmun stated that differences of opinion among different revenue agents as to
what is a "reasonable" bad debt reserve in different years was not an "abuse of discre-
tion" and was part of the "way of life in tax law," even if the facts. were unchanged.
252. The Supreme Court, in Dixon, 381 U.S. at 76, characterized the Service's ac-
tion in Automobile Club of Michigan as a correction of a "mistake of law"; in the lat-
ter case, the factor of "fellowship" in identifying an exempt club had not been considered
relevant for tax years prior to the effective date of the revocation of the ruling. Cf. Com-
missioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 606 (1948) in which a "change in the legal climate"
prevented a taxpayer from using collateral estoppel as a defense.
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ings"' thereby reducing the reliance interest and enlarging the boundaries
within which the agency can act before a departure can be found arbitr-
ary.254 Second, since the power to revoke rests only with the national office,
not enforcement officials, 5 the risk of capriciousness in the exercise of dis-
cretion is reduced. Third, published rulings rarely involve the special
interests which exempt organizations arguably possess. And, finally,
although published rulings frequently involve judgments based on facts,25
the relevant legal considerations are often articulated so that it is easier
to explain a reversal.
There is one limited situation, however, in which the Supreme Court's
analysis of abuse of discretion has apparently given weight to a tax-
payer's reliance interest in a published ruling. Ironically the suggestion
appears in the Dixon case,257 which emphatically refused to protect this
interest.258 However, when the court turned to deciding whether there
was an inequity which amounted to an abuse of discretion in the revoca-
tion of a published ruling, it seemed to consider the reliance interest," 9
which, by itself, had been found too insignificant to support the taxpayer's
claim. The Service had ruled publicly that original issue discount was
entitled to capital gains treatment upon the redemption of certain-types
253. See notes 223 (published rulings) supra and 232 (private rulings) supra.
254. Some cases dismiss internal agency rules as "directory" not "mandatory"
(Luhring v. Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 560, 565 (4th Cir. 1962) (Service rule providing for
hearing before Appellate Division)) or "self-serving" (United States v. Jaskiewicz, 278
F. Supp. 525, 537 (E.D. Pa., 1968) (Service policy not to assess taxes if criminal prose-
cution is likely)), thereby suggesting that a departure from a rule not intended to benefit
the public is always permitted. This approach has only limited validity. An agency's
own "expert" views of what protection the public needs is relevant in deciding how im-
portant it is to prevent a departure. But the ultimate issue is whether the failure to ad-
here to the rule is an abuse of discretion and this need not depend upon whom the agency
thought its rule benefited. Furthermore the agency's motives are often mixed. Thus,
published rulings are generally adhered to both to maintain public relations and to pro-
tect the taxpayer's reliance interests.
255. Treas. Reg. § 601.201 (1) (9) (1969). See, e.g., § 7605(b) which tries to pre-
vent arbitrary administrative behavior by "low-echelon" enforcement officials by allowing
a second review of taxpayers' books of account only after authorization by higher offi-
cials; United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 55-56 (1964).
256. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-388, I.R.B. 1969-28, 17, holding a foreign tax to be "in
lieu of" income taxes. Sometimes it is stated that a published ruling is a "general"
statement as opposed to an "individualized" private ruling; Bookwalter v. Brecklein, 357
F.2d at 86. However, this dichotomy refers to the difference in the invitations to rely,
not to the presence of legal or factual elements in the opinion. A similar line was drawn
in Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341 (1963) in distinguishing a published
policy not to prosecute taxpayers who voluntarily disclose their 'fraud from an indi-
vidualized inducement to confess.
257. Dixon v. United States, 380 U.S. at 68 (1964).
258. Id. at 76. The case involved an acquiescence. However, since the acquiescence
had been published in a Revenue Ruling (Id. at 71, n. 2), the Court made no distinction
between an acquiescence and a Revenue Ruling.
259. Id. at 76-80.
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of certificates which represented indebtedness. When it revoked the ruling
it did so retroactively except as to the redemption of those certificates.
Taxpayers who had sold other types of debt complained of inequity in
the retroactive application of the revocation. The Court asked, not whether
sales by the complaining taxpayers were like redemptions, but whether
the taxpayers were "warranted in reading" the published ruling to apply
to sales.2"' Although the Court found such a reading unwarranted, the
reasonableness of reliance on a published ruling was apparently relevant in
deciding whether there was an abuse of discretion when the Service
distinguished between those whom it viewed as the "core" case and the
taxpayers, who also saw themselves within the intendment of the revoked
ruling.
The foregoing suggests that despite hints in some cases the stature
of published rulings is not the result of judicial encouragement or judicial
compulsion. Furthermore, whatever judicial attitude there is to the
contrary seems influenced by the Service's own internally adopted rule
which invites taxpayers to rely on the breadth of coverage of a
ruling. The Service, therefore, can minimize these factors by withdrawing
or weakening its invitation to rely and by drafting its rulings more
narrowly.
Nothing we have suggested is intended to urge that rulings not be
published. Publication serves an important function beyond the question
of whether the publication is binding on the agency. Historically, publica-
tion was intended to prevent private rulings from favoring taxpayers
secretly thereby protecting the integrity of the private ruling process.26'
An analogous reason for publication is to enable public comment to be
made on tentative Service positions. However, these reasons lend no
force to the idea that published rulings should be binding. The whole
point would be to encourage critical scrutiny by the public of private
rulings to see if there was error.
Another reason for publishing rulings is to alert taxpayers to those
260. Id. at 78. There is also a hint in Bookwalter v. Brecklein, 357 F.2d at 82, that
reliance is relevant when the only unequal treatment is between recipients of rulings and
those who have not applied. On the other hand, the Supreme Court in Dixon later asked
whether the taxpayer's debt could "rationally be distinguished" from the debt held by
the benefited taxpayers (Id. at 79), not whether the aggrieved taxpayer was "warranted
in reading" the ruling to apply to his debt.
261. WRIGHT at 19-20, 54. Pressure to publish rulings built up in the early 1920's
when significant pressure was also brought to publicize tax returns to prevent fraud.
See R. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 136 (1954). In 1924, Congress imposed
the requirement that the names of taxpayers and the amount paid be published; Revenue
Act of 1924, § 257(b), 43 Stat. 293. The current provision (§ 6103(f)), requiring only
that names of taxpayers be available to the public, was passed in 1926; Revenue Act of
1926, § 257(e), 44 Stat. 51.
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Service positions which are binding on enforcement officials as a matter
of internal housekeeping so that there can be an intelligent discussion of a
case with an agent, instead of shadow-boxing in which the taxpayer does
not know what issues he should really be discussing.282 It also furthers
uniformity by enabling taxpayers to urge all relevant arguments on the
agent. Once publication serves this function, however, it becomes impor-
tant that the rule not publicize a mistake made in a private ruling lest it
be repeated countless times throughout the country by agents. The poten-
tial magnitude of an error results in the published rulings program push-
ing for accuracy and coherence,"2 not just public disclosure, but this does
not mean that the publication need be binding on the Service itself.
There might be some confusion about whether publication urges that
an agency be bound by its own rulings because of the Service's announced
position that agents cannot rely on unpublished positions26 and the pro-
vision in the Freedom of Information Act which prevents reliance by the
agency to an individual's detriment on "interpretations of general applica-
bility" unless they have been published.265 However, these rules limiting
the weight of unpublished statements do not suggest that published
positions should be binding. The prohibitions against reliance on un-
published rulings are sanctions which suggest nothing about the effect of
262. The requirement that a taxpayer be told when an agent asks for technical ad-
vice serves a similar purpose; Rev. Proc. 69-2 § 4.02, 69-1 I.R.B. 12.
263. WRIGHT (at 54) notes the tension between the need to publish to prevent fa-
voritism and the need to publish only accurate interpretations.
264. See fly-leaf to 1968-2 Cum. BuLL. (p. xxvii). But see Bookwalter v. Breck-
lein, 357 F.2d at 81, where there is evidence that private rulings are relied on by district
offices.
265. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (1) (D) (1966). We are not now concerned with what
the Freedom of Information Act requires the Service to publish but only with whether
the rule which prevents an agency from relying on unpublished rules has any implications
for the effect of publication.
One might ask what effect a sanction of nonreliance can have on "interpretations of
general applicability." The sanction is meaningless unless interpretative material has
weight. If later suggestions are adopted, viz., that the distinction between legislative
and interpretative regulations is often ephemeral (see text accompanying notes 283-301
infra), then the sanction can operate upon the reliance which courts would place on inter-
pretative material. It might also reduce the weight courts would give to administrative
practice embodied in statements which the law requires to be published but which are
not. On the other hand, the sanction might only operate on the agency's use of inade-
quately published interpretations in administrative adjudications (cf. NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969)). In any event, even if the sanction of nonreliance is
of little significance, items which must be published can apparently be obtained by court
order; 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a) (3) (1966).
The Service argues that only rulings applied as precedents by the Service need be
published. Treas. Reg. § 601.702(b) (1) (1967) ; Uretz, Freedom of Information and the
IRS, 20 ARx. L. REv. 283 (1967). Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis,
34 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 761, 772-75 (1967), argues that the sanction of non-reliance by the
agency does not limit the rules which must be published to those on which the agency
relies. He asserts that private rulings must be published.
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publication. As noted above, the sanction might be imposed to reveal error,
not to perpetuate it. Furthermore, the history of Congressional pressure
on the Service not to bind agents to unpublished rulings suggests only that
Congress was threatening to take away a desirable tool of internal
management in order to force publication, not that the publication must
bind the Service.266
Willingness by the administration to be bound by its published
rulings cannot, therefore, be explained as an outgrowth of either the rule-
making process, the development of case law requiring agencies to treat
people equally and to follow their own procedural rules, or as a natural
consequence of publication. The dignity of published rulings, despite the
risks earlier alluded to, results instead from an administrative imperative
felt to a considerable degree by the Internal Revenue Service. The public's
perception of what is equitable treatment and what publications should
be reliable exceeds that which a court is willing to require, and the
Service's sensitivity to the public's image of the tax collector has lead
the administration to avoid anything which smacks of capriciousness. For
this reason, the Service gives much greater weight to published rulings
than the law requires.
The view that the dignity currently enjoyed by published rulings is
excessive was noted by former Commissioner Caplin some years ago267
when he alluded to the inadequacies of published rulings as "junior
regulations," whose adoption lacked the protection of the procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act. He urged tying rulings more securely
to fact situations, making them more like judicial opinions.268 However,
a judicial decision is both a judgment and an opinion. Now that a purpose
of published rulings is to reveal the Service's thinking and is no longer
limited to enabling the public to scrutinize the judgment to see if it
reflects unwarranted favoritism, a mere recital of facts and a judgment as
to the tax result would not be adequate. 66 The opinion element in the
ruling is important. However, when opinions emerge from a court they
are the product of an adversary proceeding and often have the tentative-
ness of a lower court ruling. Published rulings, on the other hand, are
adopted without public hearing and have nationwide affect immediately.
Furthermore, the breadth of a judicial opinion is subjected to refinement
through the process of distinguishing dictum from holding. Enforcement
officials are not likely to be able to make this distinction with ease. Thus,
266. WRIGHT at 67.
267. Caplin, supra note 221 at 31-32.
268. Id. at 32.
269. WRIGHT at 64. ("A bare statement of the material facts and the results reached
is not enough.")
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a ruling that there is sufficient continuity of interest if four twenty-five per
cent shareholders receive one-half caslf and one-half comon stock, even if
half of them receive all the cash," ' could be limited so that it would not
apply if there is preferred stock or there are three shareholders owning
fifty per cent of the stock who sell for cash. Similarly, a ruling that share-
holder agreements create a second class of stock could be limited to non-
family situations." 1 In both cases, however, it is doubtful if such refine-
ments would be pursued by enforcement officials.
The careful restriction of a published ruling to a specific fact
situation is nonetheless useful in limiting the number of people who can,
with any justification, claim a reliance interest if efforts are made to
revoke it. However, in order to implement such a practice without making
the ruling useless as a guide to the agency's thinking, the task of drafts-
manship should be given to the Chief Counsel's office. A judicial opinion
should be written by lawyers.
In the long run, however, the role of published rulings can only be
de-emphasized by removing the image the public has of their current
weight. The promise that they can generally be relied upon should be with-
drawn. The public could be prepared for this step if more use were made of
"substantive revenue procedures" which lay down guidelines for the
issuance of private rulings. 2 Although they indicate a legal position, the
Service has not stated that they are binding. For example, the Service
should be able to change its Revenue Procedures on contingent equity
without difficulty. Like published rulings, they should be drafted in the
Chief Counsel's office.
The role suggested for published rulings is not as unfamiliar as it
270. See note 13 mtpra.
271. Rev. RuL. 63-226, 1963-2 Cumr. BULL. 341.
272. During 1966-68, the following substantive Revenue Procedures were published
in the corporate area: Rev. Proc. 66-34, 1966-2 Cult. BULL. 1232 (guidelines on (1) the
"substantially all" requirement for C reorganizations; (2) continuity of interest in statu-
tory mergers; (3) contingent stock (Rev. Proc. 67-13, 1967-1 Cum. BULL. 590 amplifies
the contingent stock rules) ; (4) convertible preferred stock as "section 306 stock";
(5) plan of tax avoidance in distribution and disposition or redemption of section 306
stock) ; Rev. Proc. 67-14, 1967-1 Cum!. BULL. 591 (conditions which must be present be-
fore IRS will consider issuance of a private ruling on a waiver of dividends transaction) ;
Rev. Proc. 68-32, 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 918 (operating rules when ruling request involves
stock attribution to and from a trust) ; Rev. Proc. 68-23, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 821 (guide-
lines in § 367 transactions).
In the non-corporate area, the following were issued: Rev. Proc. 67-32, 1967-2
Cum. BULL. 659 (guidelines for reporting certain antitrust recoveries) ; Rev. Proc. 67-37,
1967-2 Cum[. BULL. 668 (guidelines for exemption of farmers' cooperatives which sell non-
producer items) ; Rev. Proc. 68-19, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 810 (factors considered in taxing
political contributions).
The Revenue Ruling which listed factors to determine the deductability of prepaid
interest (see note 224 supra) would more appropriately have appeared as a Revenue Pro-
cedure.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
sounds. We simply urge that their weight be closer to that currently
afforded acquiescences 75 Acquies ences bind Service employees274 but are
not "definitive statements of the Service's intepretation of the law."2 '
They are retroactively revoked where published rulings would not be
under current practice."7 6 The Service apparently views them as expressing
very tentative views on the application of legal rules to fact situations."'
Published rulings should also play a similar role although the legal
factors to be considered and how they are to be weighted would appear
more explicitly in the "judicial opinion" drafted in the Chief Counsel's
office. Substantive Revenue Procedures would also play a similar ten-
tative role, except that they would list factors not apply them to the facts.
The implications of these proposals for the public's opportunity to
rely on Service pronouncements should not be overemphasized. Their
reduced weight would be felt in an agent's increased willingness to
distinguish a ruling both for and against a taxpayer, not in his authority
to disregard a published position entirely. There would be a greater
willingness in the national office to question the appropriatness of
granting a private ruling based on a published position. Retroactive re-
vocation would be more easily accomplished.278
Private rulings, binding as before, would still be available. Their
use would probably not increase since taxpayers who will seek insurance
policies in the form of such rulings are likely to be equally nervous at
present, 79 and there remain disincentives to apply for a ruling because
of the heightened risk of audit. A useful by-product of shifting the
authority for published rulings to the Chief Counsel's office and of
273. Uretz, The Chief Counsel's Policy Regarding Acquiescence and Nonacquies-
cence in Tax Court Cases, 44 IND. L.J. 206 (1969) ; Rogovin at 771-73.
274. Uretz, supra note 273 at 214; see 1968-2 Cum. BULL. 1.
275. Uretz, supra note 273 at 208.
276. Uretz, supra note 273 at 209-10. See, e.g., United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433,
449-50 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 922 (1968). On the other hand, the acqui-
escence in Minnesota Mortuaries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 280 (1944), which ap-
peared in 1945 Cum. BULL. 53, was revoked prospectively (1965-2 Cum. BULL. 7; Rev.
Rul. 65-259, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 174) where tiie acquiescence had been in effect for a long
time and where it had "broad general application."
277. Uretz, supra note 273 at 214. The Service would like to think that an acqui-
escence is easily limited to narrow fact situations but the prospective revocation of the
acquiescence in Minnesota Mortuaries (see note 276 supra) indicates that is not always
the case.
278. At present, the Service sometimes avoids a retroactive change of position even
when the previous legal position has not been embodied in a statement which the Service
considers to have the dignity of a published ruling; see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 68-40, 1968-2
Cume. BULL. 943 (suspends issuance of private rulings but continues prior administrative
practice for transactions entered into before Sept. 26, 1968). See also note 275 supra
concerning acquiescences.
279. Rogovin at 765, n.48.
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establishing the tentativeness of all the Chief Counsel's opinions is
that private rulings issued by the Office of the Assistant Commissioner
(Technical) could be published without the fear that they would have a
binding effect. Since they need not be tampered with prior to publication,
their issuance to the public could serve its original function bf revealing
the Service's disposition of individual cases.
There is implicit in these suggestions a perception of the risks in-
herent in the published rulings program which is different from that
taken by the Service. As noted earlier, the Service's reluctance to treat
its published positions as tentative is based on a desire not to appear
capricious. In two respects, however, this attitude seems outdated. First,
it developed at a time when tax administration was in its infancy and the
Service's reputation was much less secure than it is today. At least since
the reorganization of the 1950s,2o the Service's efforts to administer the
law equitably have successfully reduced an earlier tarnished image of
arbitrariness."8' Second, the tax law can no longer be viewed as analogous
to penal laws whose administration is subject to special limits. 282 A tax
is not a penalty on one person; it is a burden shared by all to pay for
public expenditures. If it falls too lightly on some, either others must pay
or public needs must go unsatisfied.
The effort at improving rule-making to provide an administrative
alternative to Congressional action cannot stop at recognizing published
rulings to be merely tentative steps in the development toward formulat-
ing a rule. The regulatory process remains the most effective alternative
to legislation. The first step toward accepting an increased role for
Treasury Regulations is to recognize that the personnel and process
involved in their promulgation entitle them to play a role analogous
to that of the legislature in those areas of the tax law not clearly covered
by statute. 8 Regulations are drafted in the Legislation and Regulations
280. See Penniman, Reorganization and the Internal Revenue Service, 21 PuB. AM.
REv. 121 (1961).
281. The effort to eliminate the "ounce of flesh" image has taken several forms.
First, the practice of using a quota system which admonished enforcement officials to pro-
duce revenue, not to enforce the law, has been reversed. Memorandum to the Secretary
of the Treasury, reprinted in, Hearings on Treasury-Post Office Appropriations for 1964
before the House Coinv& on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 378. Second, the Serv-
ice will attempt to avoid claims which appear to have only nuisance value. Thus, § 482
adjustments will be made if they are "significant," not "minimal." I.R.S. News Release,
August 2, 1966, 667 CCH ff 6685 at 71,665.
282. Survival of this attitude is most apparent when states try to enforce tax assess-
ments in other jurisdictions; Eichel, Adninistrative Aspects of the Prevention and Con-
trol of International Tax Evasion, 20 MIAMI L. REv. 25, 67 (1965).
283. A description of the Regulations process appears in Rogovin at 758-63. A his-
tory and analysis of Treasury Regulations appears in WRIGHT at 15-19, 26-34, 44-51.
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Division of the Chief Counsel's office.8 4 Although they are signed by the
Comissioner, they are approved by the Treasury which means that
there is a further review in the Office of the Tax Legislative Counsel
under the supervision of an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury.285
They are published only after public notice and hearing. 8 Because
Regulations are exposed to public comment made to policy oriented of-
ficials, they deserve a role far greater than they currently enjoy. Ironically,
a number of arguments made to support the regulatory authority of the
Treasury might prevent recognition of their essential legislative role. At
an earlier time, when the rule-making power of administrative agencies
seemed uncertain, emphasis was placed on "legislative" regulations which
were entitled to the weight afforded statutes because of an express delega-
tion of power from Congress.8 7 On the other hand, the inference developed
that "interpretative" regulations were of inferior quality.88 Thus, the
validity of interpretative regulations was supported with various crutches
which might now serve to hold back their use. First, the length of time
they are in effect has been considered relevant.288 However, the length of
time an administrative interpretation has been followed is useful evidence
in interpreting a statute even if it is not in the form of a regulation8.
and does not, therefore, explain the added significance regulations
enjoy.29' Second, the element of contemporaneousness of the regulation
with the passage of the statute is cited to support Treasury interpre-
tations ;292 however, to emphasize this factor would deny an on-going ex-
284. Statement of Organization and Functions, § 1113.(10) 21, reprinted in, 34 Fed.
Reg. 1657, 1680 (Feb. 4, 1969) ; WRIGHT at 27; Rogovin at 758, n.3.
285. Treas. Reg. § 301.7805-1 (a) (1960) ; WRIGHT at 27; Rogovin at 758.
286. Distinctions between legislative and interpretative regulations are not followed
by the Treasury in deciding whether to use the procedures of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act; Rogovin at 759, n.6; see Treas. Reg. § 601.601 (a) (2) (1968).
We are not referring to the "Statement of Procedural Rules" which appears in the
Code of Federal Regulations (26 C.F.R. pt. 601) (Supp. 1970), but is not published for
comment prior to adoption. They are authorized by R.S. § 161, 5 U.S.C. § 33 (1958)
(head of department authorized to prescribe regulations for conduct of department), not
§ 7805(a) (Treasury "shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforce-
ment of this title").
Temporary Regulations, published without notice and hearing, are sometimes promul-
gated immediately after a new law is passed because there would be too great a delay
until a better formed position has been developed. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 70-5, I.R.B. 1970-8,
32, announcing the intent to issue such regulations pursuant to the Tax Reform Act.
287. WRIGHT at 16-17; Rogovin at 759; see also Griswold, A Summary of the Regu-
lations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REv. 398, 401 (1941).
288. Id.
289. WRIGHT at 28.
290. See, e.g., Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 272, 280 (1960).
291. In Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 215-16 (1941), the Court suggested
that the length of time an interpretation has been followed is less significant when the
published interpretation is not a regulation.
292. WRIGHT at 27-28.
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pansive role for the Treasury to develop the law as problems arise over
the years.29 Finally, the doctrine of reenactment is now a weak reed on
which to support the validity of a regulation since tax laws are no longer
periodically renewed. 94 Emphasis on these points was perhaps suitable
before the Treasury made use of the Administrative Procedure Act's
notice and hearing provisions,"' especially since the Treasury did not
follow a practice of publishing its regulations for public comment before
the Administrative Prodecure Act was adopted."' However, now that the
procedures for issuing regulations have been assimilated into the legisla-
tive process, 11 and the agency's power to proscribe rules is more secure,
drawing sharp lines between different types of regulations can only
impede a greater rule-making role for the Treasury.
Indeed, the distinction between legislative and administrative re-
gulations has little foundation in current tax law. Legislative regulations
have been invalidated.298 Furthermore, the statutory basis for such a sharp
distinction is uncertain. Language similar to the general authorization
for regulations in section 7805 (a) has been recently held to authorize an
agency to create binding obligations. 9 While the fact that Congress has
explicitly thrown up its hands in despair and asked for help can be a
relevant factor in determining a regulation's validity, the label of "legisla-
293. See, e.g., Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 159, 162, n.1 (Ct. Cl.
1959), in which lack of contemporaneousness was a factor in the court's refusal to follow
a regulation.
294. WRIGHT at 29-31.
295. 60 Stat. 237 (1946). Most of the leading articles on the regulatory process in
the tax field were published in the early 1940's before the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act; see Griswold, mupra note 287 at n.1. There was, however, a suggestion
to increase the role of Treasury Regulations prior to the passage of the Administrative
Procedure Act; Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on Tax Administration, 58
HARv. L. REv. 477, 505-47 (1945).
296. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, MONOGRAPH OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (pt. 9); ADMINISTRA-
TION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS, S. Doc. No. 10, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1941).
297. The analogy is no less appropriate because the power of retroactive revocation
might be limited; See Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939).
The Treasury's lack of elected status justifies greater limits on the exercise of such
power. See Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440 (1928), where a limit was placed on
legislative retroactivity, although the result was questionable in that case.
298. See, e.g., Willett v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1966).
299. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 277
(1969), in which the Court upheld agency rules pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1408 (1964 ed.,
Supp. III) which states that "under § 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, . . .
HUD [may] from time to time make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act."
See also Worrell v. Sterrett, CCH Pov. LAW REP. 10575 at 11,461, No. 69 R. 33
(N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 1969), holding that 42 U.S.C.A. § 1302 authorized "legislative regu-
lations" ("The Secretary . . . shall make and publish such rules and regulations . . .
as may be necessary to ifae efficient administration of [his] functions . . ."); Lewis
v. Martin, 90 S. Ct. 1282 (1970).
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tive regulation" suggests a dignity which denigrates the authority of
"interpretative" regulations.. and helps to deprive them of the role they
should play in developing the tax law.
There are a number of risks in expanding the use of Regulations.
First, there is the danger that lobbying pressure will simply shift from
Congress to the Treasury,3"' which would be especially serious if the new
manpower needs created by expanding the use of Regulations are not met
by providing the Treasury with enough capable and experienced personnel
to handle the work. Second, premature mummification of the law
through Regulations is undesirable. Some period during which tentative
positions are applied is useful in educating the rule-maker to the nuances
of the law's application. The need for certainty in the tax law can be met
through the private rulings program without stultifying the rule-making
process. However, there is no reason why the Treasury cannot develop
regulations in an area of the law which is sufficiently aged."' Evidence of
the Treasury's willingness to perform this role appeared in the recent
Regulations to section 305303, and the effort met with Congressional
approval." 4
There is a decided possibility that these suggestions merely tinker
ineffectually with a process immune to reform. A more comprehensive
study is needed of the actual operation of acquiescences, private rulings,
published rulings, substantive revenue procedures and regulations in
areas other than corporate acquisitions to determine the contributions
each makes to coherent or confused development of the law and the
relationship of such developments to tax legislation.0 3 Enough data
300. See Shapiro, spra note 219 at 959, 961.
301. Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist-How Special Tax Provisions Get
Enacted, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1158-61 (1957).
302. Petitions from the public regarding regulations, authorized by 5 U.S.C.A.
555 (e), could play a role in identifying areas where rule-making is needed.
303. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.305-2 & 1.305-3 (1969).
304. § 305(c), added by, TAx REFORM Acr, § 421(a). The new law seems to
authorize only the Regulations involving disproportionate distributions found in Treas.
Reg. § 1.305-2 (1969), not the Regulations on required stock dividends in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.305-3 (1969).
An example of more limited Congressional approval of Treasury Regulations is the
amendment to § 351 (Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 203(a) and (b)), which deprived the for-
mation of investment companies of exempt treatment after Treasury Regulations to this
effect had been issued (Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1 (c), 31 Fed. Reg. 9549 (July 14,
1966)). The statute provided for only prospective taxation of such transactions whereas
the Regulations were retroactive. See note 231 supra for an example of a more substan-
tial Congressional objection to portions of Proposed Treasury Regulations.
305. For example, if ambitious Regulations lead to detailed Congressional responses,
Regulations might not resort to legislation. See, e.g., §§ 671-78 for the Congressional re-
sponse to the Clifford and Mallinckrodt regulations, and see note 231 supra for the Con-
gressional response to Treasury regulations on industrial revenue bonds.
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seems available, however, to suggest that a combination of public opinion
forcing closer scrutiny of the legislative process and the Treasury taking
a bolder role in finding and developing the open spaces in the statute
could lead to a reversal of the current pattern of elaborate statutory detail,
confused judicial and administrative interpretation, and ill-considered
tax subsidies.
